[SOLVED] Summaries Mary Parker Follett Theory ? – Writing

Summaries Mary parker follett theory? cover all the aspects that are in pages I have attached. No need to be full pages (short and clear are enough).Organization Theory
and Public Management
J O N A T H A N R. TOMPKINS
University of Montana
THOMSON
-*
WADSWORTH
Australia • C a n a d a • Mexico • Singapore • Spain
United K i n g d o m • United States
*
THOIVISOM
WADSWORTH
Publisher: Clark Baxter
Executive Editor: David Tatom
Senior Development Editor: Stacey Sims
Assistant Editor: Rebecca Green
Editorial Assistant: Reena Thomas
Technology Project Manager: Michelle Vardeman
Marketing Manager: Janise Fry
Marketing Assistant: Tara Pierson
Advertising Project Manager: Kelley McAllister
Signing Representative: W a r r e n Abraham
Project Manager, Editorial Production:
Catherine Morris
Art Director: Maria Epes
Print/Media Buyer: Rebecca Cross
Permissions Editor: Stephanie Lee
Production Service: Johnstone Associates
Cover Designer: J e a n e t t e Barber
Cover Image: C. Lee/PhotoLink, Getty Images
Compositor: Pre-Press Company, Inc.
Text and Cover Printer: Malloy Incorporated
COPYRIGHT © 2005 W a d s w o r t h , a division of
Thomson Learning, Inc. Thomson Learning™
is a trademark used herein under license.
Thomson W a d s w o r t h
10 Davis Drive
Belmont, CA 94002-3098
USA
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work
may be reproduced, transcribed, or used in any
form or by any means—graphic, electronic, or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
taping, W e b distribution, or information storage
and retrieval systems—without the prior written
permission of t h e publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
08
07
06
05
04
For more information about our products,
contact us at:
Thomson Learning Academic Resource Center
1-800-423-0563
For permission to use material from this
text or product, submit a request online
at http://www.thomsonrights.com.
Any additional questions about
permissions can be submitted by email
to thomsonrights@thomson.com.
COPYRIGHT © 2005 Thomson Learning, Inc.
All Rights Reserved. Thomson Learning
W e b T u t o r ™ is a trademark of Thomson
Learning, Inc.
ft
Contents
Asia
Thomson Learning
5 Shenton W a y #01-01
UIC Building
Singapore 068808
Australia/New Zealand
Thomson Learning
102 Dodds Street
Southbank, Victoria 3006
Australia
PREFACE
1
Canada
Nelson
1120 Birchmount Road
Toronto, Ontario M1K 5G4
Canada
Europe/Middle East/Africa
Thomson Learning
High Holborn House
50/51 Bedford Row
London W C 1 R 4 L R
United Kingdom
Latin America
Thomson Learning
Seneca, 53
Colonia Polanco
11560 Mexico D.F.
Mexico
Spain/Portugal
Pa ran info
Calle Magallanes, 25
28015 Madrid, Spain
Library of Congress Control Number: 2004106130
XIII
AN INTRODUCTION TO O R G A N I Z A T I O N T H E O R Y
Organization T h e o r y as a Field of Study
Major Schools of T h o u g h t
2
1
2
4
THE DISTINCTIVE C O N T E X T OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 9
Contextual Characteristics of Public M a n a g e m e n t
Fragmented Authority
9
11
An Open, Accessible, and Responsive Decision Process
12
Ambiguous, Intangible, and Partly Unattainable Goals
13
Procedural Constraints
Political Constraints
15
16
T h e Limits of Generic M a n a g e m e n t Models
18
Differences B e t w e e n and A m o n g Public Agencies
Differences in Political Environments
Differences in Technology
19
20
20
ISBN 0-534-17468-X
This book is printed on acid-free recycled paper.
III
IV
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Differences in Employee Characteristics
21
Differences in Outputs and Outcomes
Summary
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT T H E O R Y :
22
FREDERICK W. TAYLOR
23
67
Industry and M a n a g e m e n t in 1878
68
Scientific M a n a g e m e n t as a Social Philosophy
3
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PERFORMANCE
T h e Taylor System
26
27
Four Strategies for Motivating Employees
12
Systematization of Tools 72
Six Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities
Summary
71
Systematization of the Production Process
Four Models of Organizational Effectiveness
70
31
35
39
Standardization of Work 73
Wage Incentive Systems
74
Functional Foremanship
75
Taylor’s Implicit T h e o r y of Organizational Effectiveness
4
MAX WEBER’S T H E O R Y OF B U R E A U C R A C Y
Weber’s T h e o r y of Social C h a n g e
41
Task Specialization
42
Three Types of Legitimate Authority
43
Economic Rewards
43
T h e Administrator’s R o l e in G o v e r n m e n t
Fixed Official Duties
78
78
Performance Measurement
Three Corresponding Types of Administration 44
Weber’s Ideal-Type Bureaucracy
77
Work Standardization
Political Authority and Administration
79
Centralized Planning and Control
46
79
Overview of Scientific Management Theory
47
Workers as Cogs in the Industrial Machine
Hierarchy of Authority 50
Organized Labor’s Counterattack
Systems of Rules
Scientific Management as Pseudoscience
50
Technical Expertise
Career Service
52
Taylor’s Obsession with Control
52
Written Documentation
52
Limitations on the Usefulness ofWeber’s M o d e l
Limitations of a Structural Model
53
Limitations of a Time-Bound Conception of Bureaucracy
Weber’s T h e o r y of Bureaucracy in Perspective
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
56
62
87
87
Motivational Strategies
Summary
90
92
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT T H E O R Y :
58
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 60
64
86
57
58
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
85
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities
Limitations of Defining Bureaucracy as a Fixed Set of Attributes 54
Motivational Strategies
84
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
54
81
82
Scientific M a n a g e m e n t T h e o r y in Perspective
53
81
81
Scientific M a n a g e m e n t in the Public Sector
Was Weber W r o n g A b o u t Bureaucracy’s Technical Superiority?
Summary
80
Criticisms of Scientific M a n a g e m e n t T h e o r y
49
77
FAYOL, MOONEY, AND GULICK
96
H e n r i Fayol’s T h e o r y of General M a n a g e m e n t
Organizational Activities
Managerial Functions
98
98
97
VI
CONTENTS
Administrative Principles
99
Administrative Methods
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
101
James D. Mooney’s T h e o r y of Organization
The Scalar Principle
101
Motivational Strategies
102
Summary
141
149
104
HUMAN RELATIONS T H E O R Y :
104
The Functional Principle
ELTON MAYO AND FRITZ R O E T H L I S B E R G E R 152
105
Luther Gulick’s Administrative M a n a g e m e n t T h e o r y
Applying Administrative Principles to Government
POSDCORB: Core Management Functions
Putting Theory into Practice
Mayo’s T h e o r y of Social Disorganization and H u m a n
106
Irrationality
108
Coordinating Through Organizational Structure
153
T h e H a w t h o r n e Studies, 1 9 2 7 – 1 9 3 2
109
The Illumination Experiments
111
156
156
The Relay Assembly Test Room Experiments
112
T h e Research Bureaus’ Canons of Integration
The Interviewing Program
112
Herbert Simon’s Critique: Principles as Proverbs
H u m a n Relations as a Field of Study
115
116
Subject Matter and Research Methods
Administrative M a n a g e m e n t T h e o r y in Perspective
117
Organizations as Social Systems
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
H u m a n Relations in Practice
118
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities
Summary
120
165
166
167
Human Relations Training
167
Employee Counseling Programs
121
168
Criticisms of H u m a n Relations T h e o r y
122
Neglect of Structural Change
PRE-HUMAN RELATIONS THEORY:
MARY PARKER FOLLETT
165
Formal and Informal Organization
118
M a r y Parker Follett’s Contributions to Organization T h e o r y
130
Follett’s Theory of Power and Authority
Obeying the Law of the Situation
127
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
129
173
174
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
174
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities
Resolving Conflict Through Integration
Follett’s Theory of Leadership
172
H u m a n Relations T h e o r y in Perspective
Scientific Management’s Treatment of the H u m a n Factor
Follett’s Theory of Democracy
170
170
A Strategy of Manipulation
126
162
165
Dwight Waldo’s Critique: Principles as Prescriptions
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
132
135
Motivational Strategies
Summary
177
179
138
THE NATURAL S Y S T E M S PERSPECTIVE:
139
Follett’s Four Principles of Organization
Follett’s Enduring Contributions
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
157
160
The Bank Wiring Observation Room Study
Two Critiques of Administrative M a n a g e m e n t T h e o r y 115
Motivational Strategies
144
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 146
An Overview of Fayol’s Theory of Management
The Coordinative Principle
VII
CONTENTS
141
144
140
CHESTER I. BARNARD
183
Systems T h e o r y as a M o d e of Analysis 184
T h e C o n c e p t of System Equilibrium
186
176
VIII
Origins of the Natural Systems Perspective
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
188
Barnard’s Natural Systems V i e w of Organizations
231
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
190
231
Organizations as Cooperative Systems
191
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 232
The Concept of Formal Organization
192
Motivational Strategies
Barnard’s Inducements-Contributions Theory
The Altering of Motives
11
195
236
T h e Influence of General Systems T h e o r y
196
T h e Influence of Cybernetics
197
Barnard’s Contributions to Organization T h e o r y
Criticisms of Barnard’s T h e o r y
Two Path-Breaking Studies
198
Sociotechnical T h e o r y
199
Contributions of Natural Systems T h e o r y
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
246
250
251
Tom Burns: Mechanistic and Organic Management Systems
203
An O v e r v i e w of Structural C o n t i n g e n c y Factors
206
Environmental Uncertainty
208
Technology
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL THEORY:
Size
ROBERT MERTON
Strategy
211
212
Philip Selznick: Co-Optation and Its Consequences
257
259
260
Public Accountability
T h e Institutional Case Studies of Merton’s Students
261
261
215
An Assessment of Structural C o n t i n g e n c y T h e o r y
217
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t 263
217
257
258
Resource Dependence
214
The Structural Sources of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
262
263
Alvin W. Gouldner: Authoritarian Management
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities
and Its Consequences
Motivational Strategies
220
Peter M. Blau: Quantitative Performance Records and
Their Consequences
Threats to Organizational Functioning
267
PARTICIPATIVE
MANAGEMENT THEORY:
KURT LEWIN AND RENSIS LIKERT
224
A Continuing Cycle of Adaptive Responses 227
230
12
224
Dysfunctional Consequences and Institutional Strains
Weber’s T h e o r y Modified
Summary
266
222
An Implicit T h e o r y of Organizational C h a n g e
226
252
Joan Woodward technology’s Influence on Structure 254
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 205
Manifest and Latent Functions
240
244
Structural C o n t i n g e n c y T h e o r y
Merton’s Approach to t h e Study of Sociology
239
241
An Assessment of Sociotechnical T h e o r y
202
203
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
Motivational Strategies
THE OPEN S Y S T E M S PERSPECTIVE: SOCIOTECHNICAL
AND STRUCTURAL CONTINGENCY T H E O R Y
196
The Functions of the Executive
Summary
233
194
The Process of Decision
The Moral Aspect
Summary
192
Limits on the Exercise of Formal Authority
10
IX
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
K u r t Lewin’s Studies in G r o u p Dynamics
270
273
Studies in Autocratic and Democratic leadership
Action Research in Industry
277
274
265
X
Lewin’s Contributions to Organization T h e o r y
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 320
281
Rensis Likert’s T h e o r y of Participative M a n a g e m e n t
The Principle of Supportive Relationships
Group Decision Making
284
High Performance Goals
287
XI
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Motivational Strategies
281
Summary
284
14
Likert’s Contributions to Organization T h e o r y
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
324
Q U A L I T Y MANAGEMENT T H E O R Y :
W. EDWARDS DEMING AND JOSEPH JURAN
287
327
T h e Origins and Evolution of Quality M a n a g e m e n t T h e o r y
289
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
322
Stage 1: Development of Statistical Process Control (SPC)
289
328
328
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 290
Stage 2:Total Quality Control (TQC) as a Management Function
Motivational Strategies
Stage 3: Adoption of SPC by the Japanese
Summary
192
321
Stage 4: Emergence of a Uniquely Japanese Form of TQC 334
293
Stage 5 :The “Discovery” of Quality in the United States 338
HUMAN RESOURCES THEORY:
Two Key Leaders in the Quality M a n a g e m e n t M o v e m e n t
DOUGLAS MCGREGOR AND CHRIS A R G Y R I S
Maslow’s Hierarchy of N e e d s
Deming’s Fourteen Points
339
Juran’s Structural Approach to Quality Management
297
T h e H u m a n Side of Enterprise
Theory X
296
Quality M a n a g e m e n t and Organization T h e o r y
299
Quality M a n a g e m e n t in the Public Sector
300
Relevance
347
Full Development and Use of Human Resources 303
Obstacles
349
Decentralization and Delegation
Prospects for Success 350
Theory Y
302
Relinquishing Control
304
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
304
Using Intrinsic Rewards to Motivate
Management by Objectives and Self-Control
Job Enrichment
Motivational Strategies
Summary
308
McGregor’s Contributions to Organization T h e o r y
Integrating Individual and Organizational N e e d s
The Growth Needs
347
351
355
356
309
310
15
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PERSPECTIVE
AND S Y M B O L I C MANAGEMENT T H E O R Y
311
The Effects of Formal Structure on the Individual
346
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 353
307
308
Self-Managing Work Teams
344
351
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
306
313
T h e Organizational Culture Perspective
360
361
The Effects of Directive Leadership and Management Controls 315
A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Organizational
Authentic Relationships
Culture
315
Argyris’ Contributions to Organization T h e o r y
H u m a n Resources T h e o r y in Perspective
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
317
316
362
Three levels of Organizational Culture
The Concept of Cultural Strength
362
365
Mechanisms for Embedding Cultural Values and Assumptions 366
320
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
339
320
33
CONTENTS
XII
Difficulties Inherent in C o n d u c t i n g Cultural Research
T h e Practitioner-Oriented Literature
William Ouchi’s T h e o r y Z
367
365
369
Pascal and Athos’ T h e Art of Japanese M a n a g e m e n t 3 73
Assessing the Practitioner-Oriented Literature
Visionary Leadership
376
Preface
379
Transformational Leadership
380
The Learning Organization
382
Relevance for Public M a n a g e m e n t
383
Models of Organizational Effectiveness
383
Mechanisms for Coordinating and Controlling Work Activities 385
Motivational Strategies
Summary
16
386
387
E X C E L L E N C E IN GOVERNMENT
INDEX
402
392
T
he literature relating to complex organizations is so rich and diverse that
determining h o w to present the material is a challenge in itself. This
book divides the literature into major schools of thought and examines
each in turn. It takes a historical approach in which each school is examined
in the chronological order in which it emerged and gained prominence. This
is not to suggest, however, that organization theory has evolved over time in a
linear fashion. Far from it. Some schools of thought have built on earlier ones,
some have rejected earlier theories and offered alternative paradigms, and still
others have struck off in entirely n e w directions. Despite these twists and
turns, the chronological approach has several advantages. It enables the reader
to place each school in a specific historical context, trace the development of
core organization and management concepts over time, and gain a c o m p r e hensive understanding of organization theory as a whole.
This book is written with present and future public managers in mind.
Knowledge of organization theory can be an enormous asset to managers at
all levels as they struggle to define program objectives, overcome constraints,
and accomplish their mandated purposes. Armed with theoretical and conceptual knowledge, they can better identify the factors that affect organizational
performance, determine how these factors interrelate, and decide how best to
resolve problems and attain goals. Knowledge of organization theory can also
create n e w ways of viewing organizational challenges and o p e n up new avenues for pursuing change. In short, organization theory, supported by intuition and c o m m o n sense, can be a powerful guide to action. For this reason the
XIII
XIV
PREFACE
chapters that follow do more than examine particular schools of thought. They
also explore the implications of each school for management practice and organizational performance.
Beneath the current dissatisfaction with government performance lies partially conflicting expectations and values. Taxpayers expect elected officials to
hold the fine on agency budgets (economy) and they expect public managers
to get the biggest bang for the buck (efficiency). Consumers of government
services expect their needs to be satisfied (program effectiveness) and other
stakeholders expect their interests to be taken into account w h e n policies are
made and implemented (responsiveness). Elected officials, and the public at
large, expect public servants to carry out their duties in a legal, ethical, and responsible manner (accountability). Everyone w h o comes in contact with government expects to be treated fairly (equity and due process). And government
employees expect to be sufficiently empowered that their actions can make a
meaningful difference in the quality of peoples’ lives (public service). These
partially conflicting values provide important clues about how to define superior government performance. A high-performing agency is one that achieves
its mission and carries out its mandates efficiently, effectively, and responsibly,
and with due regard for responsiveness, equity, economy, and the ethic of p u b lic service. Reformers on the left and right may argue about the relative priority of these values and h o w they are best realized, but they tend to agree that
how well government performs is a matter of vital concern to all of us.
A basic premise of this b o o k is that organization theory has m u c h to say
to public managers about h o w to strengthen government performance. This
does not mean, however, that the book is grounded in managerialism—an ideology that holds managers to be uniquely qualified by the nature of their
training to make fundamental decisions for their organizations and for society
as a whole. N o r does it advocate a particular reform ideology, such as the
N e w Public Management creed that holds that techniques commonly used
in the private sector—including specification of clear objectives, performance
measurement, rewards contingent upon performance, and greater use of market mechanisms—are the key to improved government performance. In drawing out the implications of theory for practice, this book relies instead on the
following assumptions:
1. There is no generic model of management that applies equally well to
public and private sector organizations.
All complex organizations face similar problems relating to planning,
organizing, budgeting and staffing, but decisions about which management tools or practices to use and how to use them depend upon the
unique purposes and contexts that distinguish the public from the
private sector.
2. ” G o o d management,” while important, does not guarantee superior government performance; nor is it a panacea for the nation’s economic and
social ills.
PREFACE
XV
By blaming the nation’s social and economic ills on “bad management,”
managerialism diverts attention away from other determinants of government performance, including flawed policies, inadequate budgets,
and demoralized staffs. However, if effective management is not a sufficient condition of superior government performance, it is nevertheless
a necessary one. Because government agencies perform functions that
affect the quality of life of every member of society, h o w well they are
managed is critically important.
3. Economy and efficiency are not the sole criteria by which government
performance should be judged.
Government in a democratic state is the means by which the polity
achieves its collective purposes. For this reason its performance must be
judged by criteria other than economy and efficiency alone, including
the value, quality, and effectiveness of its products and services, the legal
and ethical responsibility of its actions, the fair and equitable treatment
of those with w h o m it comes in contact, and its responsiveness to the
needs and interests of relevant stakeholders, including the public servants w h o work within them.
4. T h e exercise of managerial power is not the sole province of managers.
T h e management profession was founded on the premise that efficiency requires the separation of thinking from doing and that managers alone are uniquely qualified to make key decisions. In reality,
agency staff members are capable of considerable individual and group
self-management, that is, the exercise of responsible decision-making
power within the scope of their knowledge and expertise.
These caveats are set forth for a reason. It is important to avoid preconceived
biases so that we can approach each school of thought on its own terms and
draw out its implications for public management as objectively as possible.To
assist us in this task, Chapter 1 introduces organization theory as a field of study,
Chapter 2 establishes the unique context of public management, and Chapter 3
presents three analytical frameworks for assessing the theories of organization
reviewed in the chapters that follow.
Special thanks are due to those w h o assisted me in writing this book. Foremost among them are my wife Debra, w h o helped me improve the readability
of the final manuscript, and Judy Johnstone, for her very careful editing. I also
wish to thank those w h o reviewed the manuscript and provided me with invaluable suggestions. Among them are Juanita Firestone, Department of Sociology,
University ofTexas at San Antonio; CarolWaters, Department of Social Sciences,
Texas A&M International University; Martha Dede, Graduate Center for Public
Policy and Administration, California State University, Long Beach; Bradley
Wright, Department of Political Science, University of N o r t h Carolina at Charlotte; Alan Eisner, Department of Management, Lubin School of Business, Pace
University; and John Harris, Department of Business Administration, University
ofWisconsin—Green Bay.
An Introduction to
Organization Theory
A
c o m p l e x o r g a n i z a t i o n is an organization so large and structurally
differentiated that it cannot be managed effectively by a single individual. Corporations, government agencies, hospitals, nonprofits, and most
voluntary associations fall into this category. T h e importance of complex organizations to society cannot be overstated. T h e y are the primary instruments
through which m o d e r n societies achieve their social, political, and economic
objectives. Business enterprises, for example, provide consumer goods and services that contribute in important ways to the material well-being of society.
Similarly, government agencies provide public services and collective goods
that shape the overall quality of life. All of this is possible because complex organizations can bring together and coordinate the human, financial, and physical resources needed to achieve the m o n u m e n t a l tasks demanded of them.
W i t h o u t complex organizations m o d e r n societies could not explore outer
space, undertake large-scale construction projects, research and develop laborsaving technologies, hold their enemies at bay, or ameliorate the effects of
poverty and disease. T h e needs of m o d e r n societies and the problems they face
require the type of large-scale efforts that only government agencies and other
complex organizations can provide.
O r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y is the study of h o w and why complex organizations behave as they do. Specifically, it is the study of formal structures, internal
processes, external constraints, and the ways organizations affect and are affected by their members. Understanding today’s complex organizations is essential to the practicing manager because knowledge is the key to effective
2
CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZATION T H E O R Y
action. Theoretical knowledge places managers in a better position to understand h o w organizational realities both facilitate and constrain their efforts. It
also helps t h e m understand the complex interrelationships among organizational variables.This in turn helps managers to diagnose problems and decide
upon appropriate courses of action. In short, there is much to be gained from
the study of organization theory.
This book takes a performance-oriented approach to the study of organization theory. Its primary aim is to assist in making useful connections among
organization theory, management practice, and organizational performance.
Achieving this goal is constrained by the fact that the field of organization
theory is broad in scope and without clear boundaries. It comprises a seemingly endless body of scholarly works from a diverse range of academic disciplines.The focus of any particular theorist may range from the lone individual
performing a narrowly denned task to the organization as a whole seeking to
survive in a hostile environment. As a result, mastering organization theory
can be a daunting, even overwhelming, objective for students of managem e n t . T h e challenge for this b o o k is to introduce organization theory in a
way that is easily digestible and ultimately useful to current and future
managers. It begins and ends with a deceptively simple question: H o w can
organization theory enhance managerial effectiveness and organizational performance? As will soon b e c o m e apparent, the question is more easily asked
than answered.
of hierarchy, lines of authority, and degrees of departmentalization) and h o w
they are affected by goals, strategies, size, technologies, and environmental constraints. They often examine the effects of structural arrangements on organizational participants as well. Foremost among those embracing a macro
perspective are sociologists. It was R o b e r t Merton and his students at C o l u m bia University in the late 1940s, for example, w h o first outlined the b o u n d aries of a field of study dealing with organizations. This macro perspective
will be evident in Weber’s theory of bureaucracy (Chapter 4), administrative
management theory (Chapter 6), structural-functional theory (Chapter 10),
and open systems theory (Chapter 11).
A second subfield, generally called organizational behavior, takes a m i cro perspective—focusing on individuals and groups as the basic units of
analysis and seeking to understand their behaviors and interrelationships.
Works in this subfield typically investigate the attitudes, motivations, and performance levels of organizational members. A primary purpose of research in
this subfield is to help managers understand how to align individual and organizational interests so that everyone is served by the attainment of organizational objectives. Foremost among those contributing to research in this
subfield are social psychologists and management specialists.This micro perspective is reflected in h u m a n relations theory (Chapter 8), natural systems
theory (Chapter 9), and human resources theory (Chapters 12 and 13).
ORGANIZATION
THEORY
AS A F I E L D OF S T U D Y
Organization theory is neither a single theory nor a unified body of knowledge. Rather, it is a diverse, multidisciplinary field of study. Scholars from many
disciplines have contributed to the field, examining organizations from various
perspectives, focusing their analysis at different levels, and seeking answers to
different questions. Although this field has a wealth of useful information to
offer, its breadth and diversity prevent it from being readily digested and mastered. Confronted with literally thousands of works, students of management
may well experience a m o m e n t of panic as they contemplate h o w to master
organization theory and the lessons it has to offer. For effective learning to o c cur, the diversity and complexity of the field must somehow be reduced to
readily digestible portions. This is typically accomplished by grouping works
with similar theoretical assumptions or research objectives and studying each
body of literature in turn.
O n e such strategy entails dividing the field of organization theory into
three broad subfields.The first, also called o r g a n i z a t i o n theory, embraces a
macro perspective—focusing on the organization itself as the basic unit of
analysis and seeking to explain how and why organizations behave as they do.
Works in this subfield typically investigate structural arrangements (e.g., levels
1
3
2
Finally, it is possible to identify a third subfield that cuts across the preceding two. T h e t e r m m a n a g e m e n t t h e o r y refers to those works in the larger
field of organizational analysis that focus specifically on management
processes and practices. Such works are often prescriptive in tone and applied
in nature, analyzing organizations in terms of ways to improve management
practice and organizational performance. Examples include Frederick Taylor’s
Principles of Scientific Management and Douglas McGregor’s The Human Side of
Enterprise.
Although some scholars prefer to think of organization theory, organizational behavior, and management theory as separate fields of study, as a matter
of convention the term o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y is widely used to refer collectively to all three sets of literatures. Given the purpose of this b o o k —
to explore the linkages between management practice and organizational
performance—it is important for analysis to focus on all three dimensions of
organizational life: structure, behavior, and practice.
Because these subfields are themselves rather broad and therefore difficult
to master, another strategy is to divide the field of organization theory into distinct schools of thought, regardless of the subfield to which they relate, and to
study them more or less in the order of their historical emergence.This chronological approach has several advantages. First, it allows us to anchor our understanding of each school of thought by placing it within a specific context. For
example, Frederick Taylor’s advocacy of close supervision is more understandable in the context of the early twentieth-century factory system than it would
be in the context of the government agency of today. Second, the chronological approach allows us to see the evolutionary character of organization theory
4
E x h i b i t 1.1
CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZATION T H E O R Y
Major Schools of T h o u g h t
School of
thought
E x h i b i t 1.1
continued
Central focus
Historical era
Representative
theorists
School of
thought
Central focus
Historical era
The theory of
bureaucracy
(Chapter 4)
Identifying the structural
characteristics that
facilitate administrative
efficiency.
1890s–1910s
Max W e b e r
Open
systems
theory
(Chapter 11)
Keeping the organizational
system viable through internal
maintenance and external
adjustment.
1950s-1970s
Scientific
management
theory
(Chapter 5)
Using scientific study
and rational planning
to enable fast and
efficient task performance.
1890s–1920s
Frederick Taylor
Frank Gilbreth
Henry Gantt
Katz and Kahn
James D. Thompson
Joan Woodward
Emery and Trist
Burns and Stalker
Lawrence and
Lorsch
Administrative
management
theory
(Chapter 6)
Identifying the
administrative principles
that allow organizations to
accomplish complex tasks.
1910s–1930s
Henri Fayol
James Mooney
Luther Gulick
Enhancing motivation and
1940s-1960s
Human
productivity by satisfying
resources
the full range of human needs.
theory
(Chapters 12, 13)
Kurt Lewin
Rensis Likert
Abraham Maslow
Chris Argyris
Douglas McGregor
Frederick Herzberg
Pre-human
relations
theory
(Chapter 7)
Enhancing morale and
securing cooperation by
depersonalizing the
authority relationship.
1920s
Mary Parker
Follett
Quality
management
theory
(Chapter 14)
Institutionalizing a cultural
commitment to continuous
improvement and customer
satisfaction.
1950s-1980s
Human
relations
theory
(Chapter 8)
Adjusting workers to
1930s-•1940s
the workplace and securing
their cooperation using various
behavioral methods.
Elton Mayo
Fritz
Roethlisberger
Armand
Feigenbaum
W . Edwards
Deming
Joseph Juran
Kaoru Ishikawa
Maintaining cooperative
systems by offering
inducements and exercising
moral leadership.
1930s- 1940s
Chester Barnard
Creating a culture committed
to high performance through
visionary leadership and
symbolic management.
1980s-1990s
Natural
systems
theory
(Chapter 9)
Organizational
culture and
leadership
theory
(Chapter 15)
Edgar Schein
William Ouichi
Pascale and Athos
Tom Peters
Structuralfunctional
theory
(Chapter 10)
Identifying the functional
and dysfunctional
consequences of bureaucracy.
1940s- 1950s
Robert Merton
Philip Selznick
Alvin Gouldner
Peter Blau
continued
as it has developed over time, albeit in a nonlinear fashion. Ideas found to be inadequate or incomplete often give rise to new ideas about how to organize and
manage. Finally, examining one school of thought at a time allows us to tackle
the field of organization theory in more readily digestible packages.
Exploring these schools of thought is important to practicing managers b e cause each offers an explicit or implicit theory of organizational effectiveness.
More specifically, each provides a unique lens through which to view and u n derstand organizational dynamics, a distinct set of concepts and methods for
improving performance, and a specific set of values for linking organizational
means to organizational ends. A few representative examples serve to underscore the relevance of these schools of thought to what public managers do:
•
Scientific m a n a g e m e n t theory emerged in the early 1900s as industrial
engineers such as Frederick Taylor sought to put every aspect of task performance and industrial production on a rational and efficient basis. It holds
that organizational performance is enhanced by systematizing work operations, standardizing tasks, and providing economic incentives to induce superior performance. Efficiency and productivity are the primary values.
•
Administrative m a n a g e m e n t theory grew out of the efforts of theorists in the United States and abroad in the 1920s and 1930s to identify
fundamental, perhaps even universal, principles for structuring and managing complex organizations. It holds that organizational performance is enhanced by establishing an administrative structure characterized by clear
MAJOR S C H O O L S OF THOUGHT
Beginning with Chapter 4, each chapter will introduce a specific school of
thought and assess its significance for management practice. These schools,
identified in Exhibit 1.1, are simply constructs that help us assimilate the
wealth of knowledge about organizations. Although the labels assigned to
them are somewhat arbitrary, they are among the labels used most often to d e fine the boundaries of this broad and diverse field of study.
Representative
theorists
6
AN INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZATION T H E O R Y
CHAPTER ONE
7
lines of authority from top to bottom, a distinct division of labor among
departments, and delegation of power and authority to administrators
commensurate with their responsibilities. Structural and administrative rationality are the primary values.
aging members to adopt these values and vision as their own, and creating
a strong organizational culture in which shared values and vision tie m e m bers together in common cause. Intrinsic satisfaction, social cohesion, and
commitment to organizational purposes are the primary values.
H u m a n relations theory emerged in the late 1920s as Harvard psychologists sought to interpret the results of experiments conducted at a Western Electric plant in terms of human feelings and perceptions. It holds
that organizational performance is enhanced by treating workers with respect, replacing close supervision with a more relaxed and sympathetic
form of supervision, encouraging workers to vent their feelings, and developing cohesive work teams. Personal adjustment, cooperative behavior,
and social cohesion are the primary values.
It should be apparent from the above examples that organization theory
provides answers to the kinds of questions public managers face daily, including how to coordinate and control work activities, how to motivate employees
to work toward organizational objectives, and how to define and improve organizational effectiveness. But it should be equally clear that these answers,
taken together, do not comprise a single, comprehensive, agreed-upon theory
of organizational behavior or performance. As noted earlier, diverse and divergent schools of thought have emerged over time precisely because the field of
organization theory is multidisciplinary. Theorists have asked different questions for different reasons and focused their analysis on different variables and
levels. Some have set out to explain or d e s c r i b e h o w things work based on
systematic research, while others have been content to prescribe h o w things
should work based on secondary data and their personal ideologies. In addition,
some theorists have built u p o n or reacted to previous schools of thought,
while others have launched out in entirely new directions.
All of this helps explain why it is unrealistic to expect there to be a single,
comprehensive theory of organization. And yet it is a comprehensive understanding of organizational structure and behavior that we hope to achieve. Although no single school enables us to comprehend all aspects of organizational
life, each provides a unique perspective and supplies an important piece of the
puzzle. Each helps us understand or explain certain aspects of organizational
structure and behavior so that we can begin to put together our own theory
of organizations and how best to manage them.
Developing our own theory is important because theory has the power to
inform practice. As Kurt Lewin once said, “There is nothing so practical as a
good theory.” If it is true that management decisions are driven either explicitly or implicitly by an underlying theory of management, then it is critically
important for each manager’s personal theory to be a good one, one that is
broadly informed by theoretical and conceptual knowledge as well as experience. T h e manager w h o operates on the basis of only one or two theoretical
perspectives necessarily limits his or her effectiveness as a manager. By studying organization theory, present and future public managers can learn to c o m prehend the flux of organizational life in a more holistic fashion and assess
organizational problems from multiple perspectives. An important part of this
learning process is putting together a “conceptual tool kit” comprising t h e o ries and concepts borrowed from each school of thought. This tool kit can
then be drawn upon as needed to explain various facets of organizational life
and to determine how best to resolve problems and attain goals.
Although managers and their staffs cannot control every aspect of organizational life, they can learn h o w to adjust key variables, or adjust to them, in
H u m a n resources theory evolved out of human relations theory as b e havioral scientists in the 1950s and 1960s began to delve more deeply into
the relationship between satisfying human needs and attaining organizational objectives. It holds that organizational performance is enhanced by
developing each worker’s unique talents, creating and sustaining an environment of openness and trust, removing constraints on personal autonomy and individual discretion, enriching work, and providing
opportunities for everyone to participate in decision making. H u m a n development and intrinsic satisfaction are the primary values.
Systems theory arose in several disciplines in the early 1900s as scientists
came to realize that the many variables relating to a particular phenomenon
must be understood holistically—that is, as a system rather than as a set of
simple cause-and-effect relationships. From the perspective of systems theory, the successful organization is one that achieves both internal integration
and external adaptation; it is one that maintains an optimal fit between its
mission and strategies, its internal systems and structures, and the forces in its
external environment that create both opportunities and threats.
Quality m a n a g e m e n t theory took root in Japan in the second half of
the twentieth century as American management consultants urged the
Japanese to compete on the basis of product quality and customer satisfaction. It holds that organizational performance is enhanced by designing
products and services to meet or exceed customer expectations and by empowering workers to find and ekminate all factors that undermine product
or service quality. Primary values include product or service quality, continual improvement, collective problem solving, and customer satisfaction.
Organizational culture and leadership theory. This body of theory,
at least as it relates to management, developed in the 1980s and 1990s as
scholars searched for an explanation for the growing success of Japanese
business firms. It holds that organizational performance is enhanced by articulating a clear vision of success and the values that underlie that vision,
symbolizing values and vision in every action management takes, encour-
3
8
CHAPTER ONE
ways that improve agency functioning. T h e chapters that follow are designed
to tease out the implications of organization theory for management practice so that present and future managers can perform their assigned roles
more effectively.
2
The Distinctive Context
of Public Management
NOTES
1. L. L. C u m m i n g s , ” T o w a r d O r g a n i z a tional Behavior,” Academy of Management
Review 3 (January 1978), 9 1 .
2. W. R i c h a r d Scott, Organizations:
Rational, Natural, and Open Systems
( E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N J : P r e n t i c e Hall,
1992), 9.
3. Alfred J. M a r r o w , The Practical Theorist:
The Life and Work of Kurt LeuHn ( N e w
York: Teachers C o l l e g e Press, C o l u m b i a
University, 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 2 8 .
C
hapter 1 argued that the study of organization theory can help us understand organizational dynamics, learn to diagnose and resolve problems,
and provide effective leadership in pursuit of organizational objectives.
But there is a difficulty. Insights derived from organization theory are not
equally applicable to all organizations or to all situations. Indeed, because most
of the theoretical literature was written with private businesses in mind, it is
possible to argue that organization theory holds litde or no relevance for p u b lic agencies at all. In truth organization theory does hold a great deal of relevance for public agencies, but it is not to be found in a generic one-size-fits-all
package. T h e relevance of theory must be teased out for each agency individually. T h e task of the present chapter is to isolate the distinctive features of the
context in which public management takes place, as well as the distinctive differences among public agencies, so that the relevance of theory for individual
agencies can be determined.
CONTEXTUAL
OF
PUBLIC
CHARACTERISTICS
MANAGEMENT
T h e belief that government agencies can and should be r u n like a business is
deeply ingrained in our political culture. As early as 1868 a resolution adopted
by the National Manufacturers’Association stated that it was “indispensable
a
CHAPTER T W O
10
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
1
that public affairs be conducted on business principles.” Nineteen years later
a young professor of history and political economy named Woodrow Wilson
called for a “practical science of administration” dedicated to making the business of government “less unbusinesslike.” In 1926 Leonard D.White, author
of the first textbook in this new field of study, defined public administration as
“the business side of government.” And somewhat more recently J. Peter
Grace, chairman of President Reagan’s Private Sector Survey on Cost C o n trol, claimed that the government could save tens of billions of dollars by
adopting the “commonsense business management practices that every c o m pany must use, from the corner drug store on up to General Motors, if it is to
succeed.” Its popularity notwithstanding, the belief that government can and
should be run like a business rests on the questionable assumption that public
and private management are fundamentally alike and that management techniques used in the private sector are readily transferrable to the public sector.
Fortunately, we need not enter into the debate over w h e t h e r public and
private organizations are fundamentally alike or different. As Hal Rainey has
written, this debate has tended to oversimplify both similarities and differences. Instead, we must explore the unique features of the context in which
public management takes place so that we can better assess the applicability of
theoretical concepts to government agencies and the difficulties that may be
encountered in attempting to transfer “business techniques” from the private
to the public sector.
The central question with which this book is concerned is how to enhance
government performance. This question places the spotlight squarely on those
aspects of public management that are unique and those features of the organizational context that uniquely constrain public managers in carrying out their
mandated purposes. Although management may entail the same basic functions
in public and private organizations, h o w these functions are carried out can
vary gready between the two sectors. Similarly, techniques of business management may be transferred to the public sector but h o w they are implemented
and used, as well as the probabilities of their success in enhancing agency performance, can also vary a great deal. Thus, although public and private hospitals
or public and private utilities may perform the same functions and face similar
problems, most public agencies are distinctly different from private businesses
because they exist to execute the law. By virtue of their special trust, public
managers are responsible for promoting values that go beyond efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, including responsiveness, equity, and public service. B e cause of their unique normative environment, public managers must operate
through actions which are “as fair as possible, and as uniform as possible, and
which can be taken publicly and publicly explained.” And because of the central importance of accountability in a democratic state, public managers are subject to constraints not experienced by their private sector counterparts.Their
decisions must be made within the limits of delegated authority, internal regulations, and the provisions of constitutional and statutory law.
T h e schools of thought examined in the chapters that follow offer ideas
about how to structure organizations, design work processes, coordinate work
2
3
4
5
6
11
activities, motivate employees, and set goals and plan for their attainment. If
these ideas are to serve as guides to management practice they must be relevant for and adapted to the distinctive political, legal, and institutional context
in which public management takes place. T h e sections that follow identify specific contextual characteristics that must be taken into account when applying
theory to practice.
Fragmented Authority
To protect citizens from an overbearing government James Madison designed
a constitutional system that dispersed power and fragmented authority.The designers of state constitutions followed Madison’s lead. At both levels power is
dispersed among three branches of government, each possessing its own scope
of authority and yet subject to extensive checks on its powers. Whereas most
business firms are self-contained, autonomous organizations, public agencies
are not. Most are units within the executive branch which is, in turn, just one
part of the larger authority system that we call government. As such they are
subject to the control of the chief executive and the checks that the legislative
and judicial branches of government can lawfully impose. Far from being selfcontained and autonomous, they are charged with achieving purposes set by
others, with the resources provided by others, and in accordance with procedures imposed by others. In short, they are enmeshed in a governing system
that is not intended to operate in a quick and efficient manner. Indeed, a system in which authority is fragmented and inefficiency is expected makes little
sense outside of the context of democratic governance.
T h e primary consequence of fragmented authority for agency management is readily apparent: Public managers do not have the same freedom as
their private sector counterparts to set goals, alter their missions, or adjust their
methods. For example, although public agencies can engage in strategic management, generally they cannot do so with the same degree of freedom enjoyed by private firms. T h e portability of strategic management from the
private to the public sector is limited by the fact that an agency’s mission—the
business that it engages in, its fundamental purposes, and the basic goals it exists to achieve—is determined externally by the legislature. Although considerable discretion is exercised in interpreting the agency’s mandates, all such
deliberations must take place within parameters set by law. Agencies are not
completely free, for example, to define their own missions, choose their own
structures, designate their own favorite “customers,” create their own rules, or
define their own standards of success. Public agencies can and do engage successfully in strategic management, but they do so in a context in which basic
goals have already been fixed and in which choices about h o w to carry out
their missions are constrained by law.
Fragmented authority also means that public managers must often consult
broadly with officials outside of their agencies before taking action, and they
must be prepared for the possibility that their actions or intended actions may
be overruled or preempted at any time by the decisions of legislative, judicial,
7
8
12
13
CHAPTER T W O
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
or executive officials pursuing their own political agendas and protecting their
own institutional prerogatives. Although the constitutional separation of p o w ers helps limit the abuse and misuse of power, it also contributes to a process
of managerial decision making that is difficult, complex, and time consuming.
m e n t in which important decisions are made slowly, with many starts and
stops, tends to foster frustrations, sap energies, and rob officials of a sense of
sustained forward m o m e n t u m .
Third, close scrutiny by the media, interest groups, and elected officials
tends to make public managers more cautious and less willing to take risks.
Knowing that decisions will be second-guessed, rules challenged, and new initiatives viewed with suspicion, public managers try to anticipate h o w others
will react to proposed changes and avoid taking actions that may provoke intense criticism. Such calculations can lead them to adopt rule changes or plans
that they believe are politically acceptable but which they would not otherwise have made if the choice had been theirs alone. Similarly, the strong e m phasis on accountability and the attendant fear of being called on the carpet
by an oversight body may cause them to avoid doing anything new or innovative. Donald Warwick found this to be the case in the U.S. State Department:
“If fear is not the dominant motivational appeal, it usually lurks in the background. T h e bureaucrat quickly learns that he may be subject to attack from
many fronts: head-hunting columnists, headline-hunting congressmen, irate
constituency groups, opportunistic W h i t e House assistants, rivals in other
agencies, a fickle agency director, or consumers’ groups.” Working in an environment where rewards for risk-taking are few and the hazards many “creates a strong pull toward the tried and true.” Although the State Department
may represent an extreme case, the level of public scrutiny and oversight experienced by public managers no doubt injects an element of caution into managerial decision making and raises the risks involved in undertaking efforts to
improve agency performance.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, public agencies cannot be run in the
same way as a business because decision making must be open, accessible, and
responsive. This requirement of democratic governance adds to the length and
complexity of agency decision making, reduces the ability of public managers
to determine the outcomes of their decision processes, and tends to make
them more cautious and risk-averse, thereby undermining their ability or willingness to pursue innovations aimed at improving agency performance.
An Open, Accessible, and Responsive Decision Process
If public agencies are not self-contained, autonomous entities, neither are p u b he managers free to deliberate among themselves behind closed doors and ann o u n c e their decisions w h e n they are through. Whereas business firms can
establish goals and make policies in a relatively closed fashion, public agencies
do so through a process that is remarkably open to public scrutiny, accessible
to interested parties, and responsive to the needs and concerns of specific individuals and groups. Openness, accessibility, and responsiveness are integral parts
of what makes a democratic regime democratic. Everyone reserves the right to
watch, participate, and exert influence, and agency officials are expected to listen and respond in appropriate ways. Many of these rights and expectations are
codified in law. O p e n meetings laws, for example, require agency deliberations
to be open and accessible to the public. Freedom of information laws require
agency actions and records to be open to public scrutiny. Administrative p r o cedure acts require public notice of proposed changes in administrative rules,
c o m m e n t periods, and public hearings before n e w rules can be put in force.
And citizen advisory boards are often established by law and attached to agencies to ensure that input is received and accountability maintained.
Having to make decisions in an open, accessible, and responsive manner
holds important implications for agency management. First, it means that
agency executives have less freedom to determine the outcomes of decision
processes than their private sector counterparts.The final mission statement,
management plan, policy objective, or administrative regulation is rarely d e cided u p o n by agency executives acting alone and in accordance with their
experience, expertise, and personal preferences. Instead it is typically a product
of the many compromises needed to find an acceptable middle ground among
various competing values and interests. D u e to the influence exerted by external parties, executives often perform less as decision makers and more as negotiators and facilitators, agreeing to things they might not otherwise agree to in
order to secure a workable compromise. In addition, the need to be responsive
to external authorities reduces their control over agency performance. A study
of state agencies in Ohio, for example, found that efforts to build agency capacity and improve performance often came to naught because of pressures
brought to bear by their political overseers.
Second, the many procedural requirements by which openness, accessibility, and responsiveness are guaranteed add to the length and complexity of the
decision-making process. Because of the time it takes to complete impact studies, schedule comment periods, hold hearings, carry on negotiations, and c o m plete rewrites, it is not unusual for the approval of a new regulation or
management plan to take several months, if not years. Working in an environ9
10
Ambiguous, Intangible, and Partly Unattainable Goals
T h e mandated goals of public agencies are frequently ambiguous in meaning
and intangible in nature. In some instances goal ambiguity is due to the difficulty inherent in defining legislative intent concretely and precisely, either b e cause legislators lack the necessary expertise or because they cannot reach an
acceptable agreement. W h e n Congress passed T h e Civil Rights Act of 1964, for
example, it prohibited discrimination without even attempting to define it; supporters understood that no legislation would be forthcoming if it had to await
agreement on the meaning of the term. In other instances goal ambiguity is due
to the abstract, intangible nature of what agencies are asked to accomplish.
Whereas the goals of business firms can be defined in relatively concrete terms,
such as growth, sales, and profits, agencies are charged with accomplishing much
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
CHAPTER T W O
14
by circumscribing the behavior of agency officials with rules and procedures
and refusing to delegate discretionary authority downwards. Compliance with
rules and procedures then substitutes for attainment of results as an indicator of
accountable behavior and successful performance. As Donald Warwick noted in
his study of the U.S. State Department, “Goal ambiguity and the absence of
firm performance criteria favor the development of rules and fixed operating
procedures. Rules and standards have the advantage of being means-oriented, if
not ends-oriented, guides to success. T h e official may not be sure of what he
has produced or how well he has produced it, but he can be sure that he did it
in the right way.” This helps explain why public agencies often seem more
process-oriented than goal-oriented. It has much to do with the ambiguous,
intangible, and partly unattainable nature of their goals, goals that are typically
very different in kind than those of their private sector counterparts.
Ambiguous, Intangible, and Often Conflicting Goals
” . . . national forests are established and shall be administered
for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and
fish purposes.”
The Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of
1960
At first glance the mandated purposes
of the U.S. Forest Service seem perfectly clear. The law identifies six
“multiple uses” and instructs the Forest Service to utilize the resources of
the forests “in that combination that
will best meet the needs of the American people.” But many difficult ques-
IS
tions remain: Which of these multiple
uses has highest priority? W h a t should
forest managers do w h e n timber harvesting degrades watersheds and
blue-ribbon fishing streams? W h a t
should forest managers do when a
tree-thinning project promises to improve the habitat for elk while degrading it for lynx? Is managing the
national forests as complex ecosystems even possible? As these troubling questions suggest, goals and
mandates that seem so clear on paper
become something else entirely when
it comes to implementing them.
12
Procedural Constraints
more nebulous goals, such as reducing poverty, rehabilitating criminal offenders, and protecting air and water quality. Poverty, crime, and pollution are intractable problems whose causes are not always k n o w n or, if known, largely
outside of the agency’s control. H o w to go about attaining these goals, and
whether they can be attained at all, remain open questions.
That agencies often face ambiguous and intangible goals holds important
management implications. First, it places agency executives in the middle of
contesting parties seeking to define what the goals and tasks of the agency are
or should be. Because reasonable people can disagree on such matters, public
managers often experience intense pressure from external and internal stakeholders and political overseers seeking to influence h o w the agency’s core task
is defined and carried out. This adds greatly to the complexities and uncertainties executives experience as they work to attain mission-related objectives.
Second, where goals are ambiguous and intangible in nature it is especially
difficult for managers to establish performance standards and measure results. In
many instances agency outputs are unobservable and unmeasurable.This limits
the applicability of such management tools as strategic planning, management by
objectives, and performance measurement. These tools assume that goals are relatively clear, concrete, and attainable, that success in attaining them can be measured and, consequendy, that agencies and their staffs can be held accountable for
producing the desired results. But where goals are vague and abstract it is very difficult to observe work performance, measure outputs, and set appropriate performance standards. For example, classroom learning is not readily observable or
measurable. Standardized test scores can demonstrate that learning has occurred
but cannot reveal how much of the increase is due to the efforts of the teacher.
11
W h e r e clear goals cannot be specified, firm performance standards cannot
be set, and outputs cannot be readily observed or measured, there is a strong
tendency for political overseers and agency managers to exercise accountability
Private managers are free to advance the interests of their firms as they see fit,
as long as their actions are not specifically prohibited by law. Public managers,
by contrast, are free to act only within the scope of their lawfully delegated authority and in accordance with externally imposed systems of rules and procedures. Consequently, public managers encounter many more constraints and
enjoy much less freedom of choice than their private sector counterparts.This
limits their ability to pursue organizational objectives in a purposeful and deliberate fashion. Having identified appropriate courses of action, public m a n agers find it much more difficult to put their decisions into effect.
T h e use of rules and procedures to constrain managerial discretion reflects
the emphasis placed on accountability in a democratic state. Because public officials exercise the coercive powers of the state and spend tax dollars, d e m o cratic norms require that they be held accountable for their actions. As noted
earlier, where accountability cannot be achieved by setting clear goals and m o n itoring results, the apparent alternative is to replace managerial discretion with
rules. Historically, legislative bodies have relied upon centralized control systems
to prevent fraud, waste, and misuse of authority, and to ensure fairness in hiring
employees, distributing benefits, and awarding contracts. Merit-based personnel
systems were instituted to safeguard the merit principle against the intrusions of
patronage and to protect employees from arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory treatment; line-item budgets and standardized accounting procedures to
ensure that funds are expended for their authorized purposes and in a fiscally
responsible manner; and purchasing and bidding systems to ensure that supplies
and equipment are obtained at the best available price and that contracts are
awarded in a fair and unbiased manner. N o t only do these systems specify the
rules and procedures that managers must follow but they are also enforced by
central personnel, budget, and purchasing offices that demand strict compliance.
Procedural rules and reporting requirements tend to reduce the timeliness
of hiring decisions, discourage supervisors from taking justified disciplinary
actions, limit their ability to reward their best workers, prohibit t h e m from
moving funds from one budget category to another in response to changing
16
CHAPTER T W O
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
needs, create lengthy delays in obtaining required supplies and equipment
and, in general, deny managers the flexibility they need to advance the objectives of their agencies. As these examples suggest, the problem with centralized control systems is that “constraining people from doing anything wrong
often simultaneously constrains them from doing anything right.” This was
a major theme in Vice President Gore’s 1993 National Performance Review,
w h i c h described “structures of overcontrol and m i c r o m a n a g e m e n t ” in the
federal government that leave ” g o o d people trapped in bad systems.” Although much red tape can be eliminated, operating in a democratic system of
governance means that public managers are and will continue to be subject
to a degree of accountability that is far more detailed and pervasive than that
in the private sector. In many cases the public manager longs to say “Yes,
let’s do it!” but the rules and procedures say ” N o , not so fast.” In a work
environment such as this it is easy to become constraint-oriented rather than
outcome-oriented.
fort on their boundary-spanning responsibilities.These responsibilities include
identifying stakeholder concerns, responding to critics, mediating between
contending interests, negotiating agreements, and building political coalitions
to support their management plans and policy objectives. Carrying out the
mission of an agency in an intensely political environment is not easy. T h e mission of the U.S. Forest Service, for example, is to maximize stewardship of the
nation’s natural resources by sustaining healthy and productive ecosystems. Although this may seem straightforward enough, in practice it is accomplished
only by balancing the contending views and interests of loggers, miners, hikers, horseback riders, skiers, and users of motorized vehicles. In the course of
developing management plans and agency regulations much of the manager’s
time is spent in soliciting comments, holding hearings, working out compromises, and negotiating agreements. In addition, managers must often build
coalitions of supporters to help them obtain the budgetary resources, political
clout, and operating autonomy needed to achieve their policy objectives. All
of this not only makes the decision-making process highly complex and time
consuming but it also requires managers to possess strong negotiating, conflict
resolution, and coalition-building skills.
Because they are obliged to respond to a wide range of external demands,
public managers find it particularly difficult to manage their time and focus on
goal attainment. A study by Porter and Van Maanen found, for example, that
middle managers in government were m u c h more likely than middle m a n agers in industry to cite the needs and demands of those outside of their organizations as an important variable affecting h o w they spent their t i m e . T h e
government managers reported spending more time interacting with people,
either on the phone or in face-to-face meetings, and less time on operational
planning and task accomplishment. They also reported feeling “rushed,” with
“not enough time to get things done you want to do.” O n e consequence of
working under the crush of communications from external parties and feeling
obligated to respond to their needs and demands is that it distracts managers
from their internal responsibilities, including defining the agency’s core task,
communicating a clear sense of purpose, and sustaining staff morale and forward momentum.
A second way that politics influences public management is by injecting p o litical criteria into the choice-making process.The generic management model,
with its emphasis on long-term planning, cost-benefit analysis, and rationalistic criteria such as efficiency and cost-effectiveness, has limited applicability
in a highly politicized environment. For example, decisions by agencies to close
veterans’ hospitals, military bases, or rural post offices are often reversed due
to intense public outcry despite having been made on the basis of their
cost-effectiveness and only after careful study of the available alternatives. It is
not unusual for citizens to demand the services that veterans’ hospitals, military
bases, and rural post offices provide even if they must be provided at a loss.
In short, public management is as m u c h about fashioning compromises
among competing political interests as it is about the rational attainment of
13
14
Political Constraints
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between private and public management is that the latter takes place in a highly politicized environment in which
agency decisions are shaped to a substantial degree by external pressures and
political considerations.There are three reasons for this. First, the distributive,
redistributive, and regulatory policies of government affect the well-being of
every member of society. Because agency decisions produce benefits for some
and impose costs on others, affected individuals and groups will seek to influence the exercise of administrative discretion. Second, the norms of democratic governance dictate that all affected parties must have opportunities to
influence agency decisions either directly or through their elected representatives.This means that those outside the boundaries of the agency cannot be ignored or shut out of the administrative process. Finally, the constitutional
separation of powers obliges public managers to serve two external masters,
the chief executive and the legislature, each claiming to represent the will of
the people and each seeking to establish political control over agency decisions. Elected executives work through their appointees to make sure that
agency decisions are consistent with their political agendas, individual legislators pressure agency officials to respond to the needs of their constituents, appropriations committees attach provisions to budget bills detailing h o w funds
are to be spent, and legislatures amend the law to prevent, or at least constrain,
the agency from doing what the legislators dislike. As a result, agency goals are
set and implemented in the context of cross-cutting political pressures. Decision making is slower and more disjointed than in the private sector, bearing
few of the characteristics of rational planning and policy making described in
the generic management literature.
Politics affects public management in specific ways. First, it causes middleand upper-level managers to be externally directed, focusing their time and ef-
17
15
18
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
CHAPTER T W O
organizational objectives. Because they operate in a highly political environment, public managers cannot make decisions based solely on analysis of costs
and benefits, rational means-ends calculations, or efficiency and effectiveness
criteria. N o r are they free to interpret the agency’s mission, set priorities, formulate objectives, and plan for their attainment solely on the basis of their
professional training and expertise. Rational intentions and mission-oriented
plans often play only a limited role in determining agency actions and policy
outcomes because of the large number of parties that want to be involved and
the amount of political influence they can bring to bear.
THE LIMITS OF G E N E R I C
MANAGEMENT
Limits on the Use of Generic M a n a g e m e n t Models in G o v e r n m e n t
Elements of a generic model
Establish clear goals and
clear sense of mission.
Limits on their applicability in public agencies
Basic goals are externally determined by the legislature.
Legislative bodies rarely define goals in clear
and concrete terms.
An open and accessible decision process allows external
parties to influence how goals will be defined and
achieved.
Agencies are often assigned multiple, conflicting goals,
making it difficult to establish a shared sense of mission.
Delegate authority and
responsibility for achieving
goals.
Legislative bodies are reluctant to grant full autonomy
because it reduces their ability to hold agencies
responsive to their wishes.
Elected executives are reluctant to grant full autonomy
for the same reason.
MODELS
Many of those w h o argue that government agencies can and should be run in
a more “businesslike” fashion also believe in the possibility of developing a
generic model of management, one that specifies practices and techniques that
are applicable in all organizational settings. O n e such model underlies the recent managing-for-results reform movement, including the efforts of the N a tional Performance R e v i e w ( N P R ) team in 1993 to “reinvent” the federal
government. At the kick-off meeting with Vice President Gore the N P R staff
received wallet-sized laminated cards asserting that excellence is achieved by
creating a clear sense of mission, delegating authority and responsibility, replacing regulations with incentives, developing budget-based outcomes, and measuring success by customer satisfaction. This set of generic prescriptions begs
a critical question: Do department heads, agency directors, and bureau chiefs
have the same freedom of movement, scope of authority, and probabilities for
success as their private sector counterparts in setting goals, monitoring performance, and achieving results? If the analysis presented earlier in this chapter is
correct, they do not.
Asking government agencies to operate in a more “businesslike” fashion is
perfectly appropriate, as long as it is clearly understood that general management principles and practices might need to be modified to fit the unique
context of public management and that the probabilities for their success in
enhancing organizational performance may not be as high as in the private
sector because there are values at stake other than effective attainment of mission-related goals. These conclusions are central to the purposes of this book.
They emphasize that the principles and practices associated with each school
of organization theory must be assessed in terms of their relevance to public
organizations in general and to each agency in particular.
Exhibit 2.1 summarizes w h y it is difficult to apply generic management
models in governmental settings. Elements typically found in generic models
are identified on the left and some of the limits on their applicability to public
agencies are summarized on the right.
16
E x h i b i t 2.1
19
Top managers are reluctant to delegate authority and
responsibility downward because they know they will
be held accountable for the “mistakes” of their
subordinates.
The vague and abstract nature of goals encourages
external overseers and agency managers to rely on
procedural rules to ensure accountability, further
reducing possibilities for empowerment.
Identify desired outputs
and outcomes and measure
results.
W h e r e goals are ambiguous and intangible, and where
outputs and outcomes are unobservable, it is extremely
difficult to identify appropriate performance indicators
and measure results.
Hold employees accountable
for results by linking rewards
to performance.
Linking rewards to performance is impossible where
appropriate performance indicators cannot be
identified.
Linking rewards to performance is inappropriate where
failure to produce desired results is due to inadequate
resources or factors beyond the agency’s control.
Public managers often lack the authority and resources
needed to reward superior performance.
Agencies are responsible for secondary goals, including
fairness, openness, and responsiveness, which constrain
the attainment of mission-related objectives.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
AND AMONG PUBLIC AGENCIES
N o t only do public and private organizations differ, but public organizations
differ among themselves. Government bureaucracy is not a single, monolithic
entity that can be described in terms of a single, fixed set of characteristics. Individual agencies can and do vary greatly in terms of the environments they
20
CHAPTER T W O
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
face, the technologies they rely upon, the kinds of workers they employ, and the
nature of their outputs and outcomes. These variations hold important implications for ways in which individual agencies are organized and managed. Consequently, the differences between and among agencies must also be considered
w h e n assessing the relevance of organization theory for public agencies. T h e
sections that follow highlight a few of the most important sources of variation.
tern of tools and techniques used by an organization to carry out its tasks. In
1967 sociologist James D.Thompson created a scheme for classifying organizations according to their core technology. A l o n g – l i n k e d t e c h n o l o g y involves relatively routine tasks performed in succession. T h e mass-production
assembly line provides an example. As each worker completes a distinct task,
the assembly line passes the product to the next worker. W i t h this type of technology it is relatively easy to select tools, construct appropriate work-flow
arrangements, plan for the completion of work objectives, and direct the actions of workers through the use of standardized operating procedures. This
type of technology is found in the public sector where paperwork must be
processed or routine matters investigated, such as handling applications for permits or licenses, auditing tax forms, or collecting evidence at a crime scene.
A m e d i a t i n g t e c h n o l o g y links people together in order to satisfy their
respective needs. A state employment security office provides an example. It
creates a link between those seeking jobs and those seeking to fill jobs. This
type of work technology is less routine because it brings multiple clients t o gether w h o are widely distributed in time and space. Consequently, it requires
standardized methods that go beyond simple operating procedures.
Finally, an intensive t e c h n o l o g y involves altering a product or person in a
way that cannot be standardized because the workers’ actions must be based on
constant evaluation and feedback. A public hospital provides an example of this
type of technology. Different medical treatments and diagnostic devices are used
depending on the symptoms presented and ^ arious adjustments are made depending on h o w the patient responds to treatment. Determining which tools
to use and h o w to use them cannot be fully standardized because each case is
unique and considerable j u d g m e n t is required. In addition, coordination of
work must be achieved more by personal agreements backed up by professional
standards than by centralized control and the exercise of formal authority.
Although Thompson’s classification scheme goes only a small way toward
differentiating among public organizations, it does help establish how technology influences the setting of objectives, the management of people, and the
structure of work. It helps to explain why some agencies perform in a regular
and predictable manner and others do not. As with political environments, the
relevance of a particular school of thought for a specific agency may depend
on that agency’s core technology.
Differences in Political Environments
As noted earlier, public managers often have limited effective control over the
decisions they make in the course of strategic planning, goal setting, and rule
making. H o w much effective control they possess tends to vary with the political environments they face. Regulatory agencies, for example, typically i m pose costs on particular industries and therefore experience a high degree of
conflict. They are deeply dependent on the regulated industry for information
and on powerful support groups to help them carry out their missions. Effective control over key agency decisions is often low in such situations, especially
where the coalition of supporters traditionally favoring regulation has weakened. Other agencies, such as the U.S. Social Security Administration, distribute
benefits to influential client groups with program costs widely dispersed. An
agency of this kind tends to experience higher effective control because a d o m inant interest favors its goals and no organized group opposes it, although even
here the client group may try to influence how the agency carries out its task.
Still other agencies, such as the U.S. Forest Service, must contend with several
rival interests seeking to influence the agency’s goals and plans. Although this
reduces autonomy and the timeliness of decisions, public managers may still enjoy a considerable degree of effective control if the rival interests are equally
balanced in terms of power and influence. In such instances interest group pressures often set the outer boundaries of decision making while leaving managers
relatively free to define the agency’s mission and determine the best way to
carry it out in accordance with legislative intent and professional norms.
17
An intensely political and hostile environment imposes limits on what p u b lic managers can do and what results they can hope to achieve. W i t h their
choices constrained by powerful stakeholders they are not as free as managers
facing more placid environments to define their task, create a shared sense of
mission, and pursue strategic objectives in a direct and efficient manner. Consequently, some of the schools of thought examined in the chapters that follow
(scientific management and administrative management theory, for example)
may have limited relevance for managers facing environments of this kind.
Differences in Technology
T h e relevance of a particular school of thought may also depend on the core
technology used. T h e ways agencies are organized and managed, and whether
they perform in regular and predictable ways, depend in part on their technical means of production. Technology in this instance refers broadly to the sys-
21
18
Differences in Employee Characteristics
Employee characteristics may also affect the relevance of particular schools of
thought. T h e efficacy of alternative theories about directing, supervising, and
motivating employees may depend, for example, on what the workers value,
the amount of training and education they have received, and the amount of
intellectual capital their jobs require. Well-educated employees tend to place a
higher value on individual autonomy and personal growth than do less welleducated employees. Consequently, those schools of organization theory
that emphasize narrow division of labor, routinization of work, and economic
19
22
CHAPTER T W O
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
incentives are likely to have limited relevance for agencies with highly educated workforces.
Similarly, a high proportion of government employees hold knowledge-intensive j o b s . These jobs involve the creation of knowledge or the creation of
“smart products” through the application of “trained intelligence.” Employees
holding these jobs are not interchangeable labor commodities whose j o b performance depends on their manual dexterity or accumulated experience.
Rather, the quality of their work depends on their intellectual capacity and the
human capital they invest in their work. Special efforts are required to attract,
develop, and retain workers of this kind. In addition, many of these workers are
professionally trained. Because they believe their behavior is governed by externally defined codes of conduct, professionally trained employees are less inclined to abide by the preferences of managers or respond to traditional
organizational incentives. Creating a shared sense of mission is especially difficult in agencies employing different types of professionals, each trying to define the task of the agency in terms of their o w n external reference points.
Once again, those schools of organization theory that emphasize the routinization of work, the exercise of formal authority, and the use of economic incentives are likely to have limited relevance for agencies that rely extensively on
professionally trained workers and knowledge-intensive jobs.
or political overseers that the rules were followed faithfully. Consequently, this
type of agency tends to be means- rather than results-oriented. H o w the j o b is
performed is more important than whether the desired outcomes are
achieved. W h e r e outcomes are unobservable it is very difficult for agency managers to adopt the managing-for-results prescriptions found in the generic
management literature.
A craft agency is one in which outcomes but not outputs can be observed.
Managers may not know what a fire fighter or a criminal investigator is doing
in the field, but they can determine the results as measured by fires extinguished and criminal cases closed. Such agencies can be more goal-oriented
than procedural agencies. Because they can evaluate outcomes there is less
need to micro-manage workers by constraining their decisions with endless
rules. Consequently, craft agencies tend to be more decentralized than procedural agencies.
A c o p i n g agency is one in which neither outputs nor outcomes are readily observable. Although school administrators can observe a schoolteacher
giving lessons, in practice they rarely do so. As a result, neither the outputs
(lessons) nor the outcomes (learning) are easily observed. U n d e r these circumstances managers may have no clear idea about h o w to improve agency performance and may become very complaint-oriented as a result. Unable to
verify the facts of the situation, the manager may choose to side with a c o m plaining client over a dedicated staff member, appeasing the client at the expense of internal morale. Managers of thes; agencies must cope with a difficult
situation. In keeping with the public school example, they must try to hire the
best applicant without knowing what the best applicant looks like and they
must develop, evaluate, and retain good teachers without valid measures for
distinguishing good teachers from bad. Procedures are typically put in place to
control workers and the most observable activities are measured, but without
much hope that they will guarantee high performance.
Managers are often said to be responsible for establishing clear goals and
performance standards, measuring outputs and outcomes, and holding e m ployees accountable for results.Wilson’s analysis suggests that their ability to do
so depends on whether agency outputs and outcomes are readily observable.
Consequently, those schools of organization theory that assume a high degree
of formal rationality in connecting means and ends are likely to have less relevance where this criterion cannot be satisfied.
20
Differences in Outputs and Outcomes
T h e relevance of a particular school of thought may also depend on whether
the agency’s outputs (immediate work products) and outcomes (ultimate results) are concrete and observable.James Q.Wilson has developed a four-fold
classification scheme to capture these differences. In a p r o d u c t i o n agency the
goals are clear and the outputs and outcomes readily observable. Consequently,
it is relatively easy to design a compliance system that achieves desired results
in a predictable manner. M u c h as suggested in the generic management literature, clear objectives and work standards are set, outputs and outcomes are
measured, and workers are held accountable for results. In these respects p r o duction agencies can be “run like a business,” although they still must contend
with the many procedural and political constraints that characterize the public
sector. Examples include the U.S. Postal Service with respect to delivering the
mail and the U.S. Social Security Administration with respect to generating social security checks.
A procedural agency is one in which the outputs or work activities are
observable but the outcomes are not. For example, the staff of a mental hospital can be observed providing various forms of treatment but the results in
terms of restored mental health are not immediately apparent. Similarly, health
and safety inspectors can be observed enforcing rules relating to use of hazardous chemicals, but w h e t h e r enforcement actually protects the health of
workers cannot be determined with confidence. In the absence of observable
outcomes agency managers tend to rely on procedural rules to limit discretion
and reduce “mistakes.”When controversy erupts, managers can assure clients
23
SUMMARY
Many of the contextual elements described in this chapter are clearly c o n straints. Constraints, as defined by James D.Thompson, are structural and procedural conditions to which an organization and its management must adapt.
T h e constraints faced by public managers—limited authority, ambiguous goals,
externally imposed rules, inadequate resources, and political demands—cause
21
24
THE DISTINCTIVE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC M A N A G E M E N T
CHAPTER T W O
many managers to adopt a psychology of failure. As Steven C o h e n has o b served, these managers “lower their expectations, abandon any sense of vision,
and ridicule those w h o retain ambitious goals.” Having deliberately chosen
to be caretakers rather than leaders, these managers focus on avoiding controversy and doing only what is necessary to keep their agencies functioning. Although this might seem like a rational response to a difficult situation, the tasks
public agencies perform are too essential to the well-being of society to allow
a psychology of failure to persist. Public agencies can be managed effectively, as
the many awards given for excellence in government clearly demonstrate.
T h e key to effective management, according to C o h e n , “is an active and aggressive effort to overcome constraints and obstacles.” Effective managers are
those w h o can maneuver skillfully among the many political demands and administrative constraints to create an environment in which they can achieve
desired results.
Although active and sustained leadership is important to effective management, so too is conceptual and theoretical knowledge. Having established the
distinctive context in which public management takes place, we are n o w able
to assess what organization theory can teach us about overcoming constraints
and organizing and managing effectively.
22
23
24
NOTES
1. W i l l i a m E. N e l s o n , The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-1900 ( C a m b r i d g e :
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982), 120.
2. W o o d r o w Wilson, ” T h e Study of A d ministration,” Political Science Quarterly 2
(June 1887), 2 0 1 .
3. L e o n a r d D . W h i t e , Introduction to the
Study of Public Administration ( N e w York:
M a c m i l l a n , 1939), preface t o f i r s t e d i t i o n .
4. J. P e t e r Grace, Burning Money:The Waste
of Your Tax Dollars ( N e w York: M a c m i l l a n
P u b l i s h i n g , 1984), 5.
5. H a l G. R a i n e y , Understanding and Managing Public Organizations (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1991), 2 1 .
6. Paul H . A p p l e b y , Big Democracy ( N e w
York: Knopf, 1945), 6.
7 . A r i e H a l a c h m i , “Strategic P l a n n i n g
and Management? N o t Necessarily” in
J . Steven O t t , A l b e r t C . H y d e , a n d Jay
M. Shafritz (eds.) Public Management: The
Essential Readings ( C h i c a g o : N e l s o n – H a l l
Publishers, 1991): 2 4 1 – 5 4 .
8 . R o n a l d C . M o e and R o b e r t S .
G i l m o u r , ” R e d i s c o v e r i n g Principles of
Public A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : T h e N e g l e c t e d
F o u n d a t i o n of Public Law,” Public Administration Review 55 ( M a r c h / A p r i l 1995), 138.
9. B a r t o n W e c h s l e r a n d R o b e r t W B a c k off, ” T h e D y n a m i c s of Strategy in Public
O r g a n i z a t i o n s , ” foumal of the American
Planning Association 53 ( W i n t e r 1987):
34-43.
10. D o n a l d P.Warwick, A Theory of Public
Bureaucracy ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r sity Press, 1975), 102.
1 1 . J a m e s Q . W i l s o n , Bureaucracy: What
Governments Do and Why They Do It ( N e w
York: Basic B o o k s , 1989), 1 6 8 .
12. W a r w i c k ,
racy 8 5 .
A Theory of Public Bureauc-
13. R o b e r t D. B e h n , ” T h e Big Questions
of Public M a n a g e m e n t , ” Public Administration Review 55 (July/August, 1 9 9 5 ) , 3 2 1 .
14. Al G o r e , From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and
25
Costs Less ( N e w York: T i m e s B o o k s /
R a n d o m House, 1993), 2 .
Turned Upside Down ( N e w York: R a n d o m
H o u s e , 1981).
15. L y m a n W . P o r t e r and J o h n Van M a a n e n , “Task A c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d M a n a g e m e n t o f T i m e , ” i n James L . P e r r y a n d
K e n n e t h L. K r a e m e r (eds.), Public Management: Public and Private Perspectives (Palo
A l t o : Mayfield P u b l i s h i n g , 1983): 2 1 2 – 2 4 .
2 0 . E u g e n e B. M c G r e g o r , Strategic Management of Human Knowledge, Skills, and
Abilities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
1991), 3 3 .
16. R o n a l d C . M o e , ” T h e ‘ R e i n v e n t i n g
G o v e r n m e n t ‘ Exercise: M i s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e
Problem, Misjudging the Consequences,”
Public Administration Review 54
(March/April 1994), 111.
17. See J a m e s Q . W i l s o n , Bureaucracy, especially c h a p t e r 5.
18. James D . T h o m p s o n , Organizations in
Action ( N e w Y o r k : M c G r a w – H i l l , 1967),
15-18.
19. D a n i e l Yankelovich, New Rules:
Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World
21. Thompson,
Organizations
in Action.
2 2 . Steven C o h e n , The Effective Public
Manager:Achieving Success in Government
(San Francisco:Jossey-Bass, 1988), 5.
2 3 . A g e n c y awards are given b y T h e
C o u n c i l for E x c e l l e n c e i n G o v e r n m e n t
and H a r v a r d University’s J o h n F. K e n n e d y
School of Government, and by the International P e r s o n n e l M a n a g e m e n t Association; awards to o u t s t a n d i n g practitioners
are given b y T h e A m e r i c a n Society for
Public A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d T h e N a t i o n a l
A c a d e m y o f Public A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
24. C o h e n , The Effective Public Manager, 13.
M A N A G E M E N T PRACTICE AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
3
3€
Management Practice
and Organizational
Performance
Many factors constrain the performance of agencies other than poor
management.These include ill-conceived public policies, inadequate resources,
and social and economic conditions over which agencies have little control.
Although better management offers no panacea for overcoming these
constraints, it can make a positive difference. Generally speaking, the more
effective managers are in performing their tasks the more successful agencies
are in achieving their objectives. Charged with making authoritative decisions about agency objectives and the allocation of resources, managers are the
ones primarily responsible for ensuring that plans are well-made, h u m a n talents fully developed and utilized, and mandated results achieved.
A key aim of this book is to explore what organization theory can tell us
about managing public organizations more effectively. This chapter introduces
three conceptual frameworks that are used in the chapters that follow to assess
the contributions of each major school of thought. Together they provide stable points of reference for comparing the contributions of one school to another. Attention is focused on these frameworks because they correspond to
three foundational questions facing public managers committed to exercising
leadership in pursuit of organizational excellence:
1
1. What defines an effective organization and what values and methods will
bring it into being?
B
ecause government agencies exist to serve the public interest, it is essential that they perform in a superior manner. It is not good enough for
firefighters to arrive at a fire in twenty minutes if they are fully capable
of arriving in twelve. Lives and property hang in the balance. Similarly, it is not
good enough for public hospitals to reduce postsurgery infection rates from
25 to 15 percent. Too many patients will continue to die. And it is not sufficient for drivers’ license bureaus to process renewals efficiently.They should
also be conveniently located, offer comfortable waiting rooms, and treat customers with civility and respect.
As taxpayers, citizens have a right to expect “the biggest bang for the
buck,” but beyond considerations of cost-effectiveness lie other important
concerns, such as responsiveness, fairness, and quality of service. T h e interests
of all citizens are served w h e n government agencies use resources prudently,
operate efficiently, and address society’s problems effectively. In the current environment of declining confidence in public institutions, it is especially important for agencies to perform well. As governments lose their credibility with
the public, they lose their ability to attract and retain the best available talents.
Ultimately, they lose their capacity to govern. These considerations—the important role governments play in shaping the quality of life, the serious and
complex problems facing society, and the perception (right or wrong) that
governments at all levels are not doing enough to address these problems—underscore the importance of doing everything possible to enhance the performance of government agencies.
2. H o w can the organization’s many work activities be coordinated and controlled so that organizational objectives are in fact accomplished?
3. What can managers do, if anything, to encourage high levels of motivation
and performance on the part of employees?
To assist us in answering these foundational questions, the first conceptual
framework identifies four models of organizational effectiveness, the second
presents six mechanisms for coordinating and controlling work activities, and
the third outlines four strategies for motivating employees.
FOUR MODELS OF O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L
EFFECTIVENESS
Although organizational effectiveness is a central theme in the field of organization theory, there is no agreement about what it means. T h e only point of
agreement is that it does not refer to a single attribute of organizations or a
specific criterion for assessing performance. Effectiveness means something
different depending on w h o is doing the judging, the level of analysis, and
whether the focus is inputs, outputs, or processes. Consequently, effectiveness
has little meaning outside of the specific criteria used to assess it. To address
this problem R…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment

Why Choose Us

• 100% non-plagiarized Papers
• 24/7 /365 Service Available
• Affordable Prices
• Any Paper, Urgency, and Subject
• Will complete your papers in 6 hours
• On-time Delivery
• Money-back and Privacy guarantees
• Unlimited Amendments upon request
• Satisfaction guarantee

How it Works

• Click on the “Place Order” tab at the top menu or “Order Now” icon at the bottom and a new page will appear with an order form to be filled.
• Fill in your paper’s requirements in the "PAPER DETAILS" section.
• Fill in your paper’s academic level, deadline, and the required number of pages from the drop-down menus.
• Click “CREATE ACCOUNT & SIGN IN” to enter your registration details and get an account with us for record-keeping and then, click on “PROCEED TO CHECKOUT” at the bottom of the page.
• From there, the payment sections will show, follow the guided payment process and your order will be available for our writing team to work on it.