[SOLVED] University of West Georgia Mental Health Disorders Bibliography – Writing

This is for a term paper. So I will need this person to submit to me the annotated bibliography and also the paper at a later date
“An annotated bibliography is a list of citations to books, articles, and documents. Each citation is followed by a brief (usually about 150 words) descriptive and evaluative paragraph, the annotation. The purpose of the annotation is to inform the reader of the relevance, accuracy, and quality of the sources cited.”
From “How to prepare an Annotated Bibliography” here: http://guides.library.cornell.edu/annotatedbibliography
Each student must prepare an annotated bibliography containing at least 5 sources chosen from the 8 in your sources list
All five must be academic sources.
I will need a total of 8 sources, only 5 of them need to contain the annotated bibliography.CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES
CASE STUDY 1
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
BUILDING AND SUSTAINING COALITIONS
FULL VERSION
NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES
CASE STUDY 1
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
BUILDING AND SUSTAINING COALITIONS
FULL VERSION
This is one of three multimedia cases in the New York City Nonprofit Advocacy Case
Studies series. The case narratives in the series are available in both a Full Version
that includes an appendix with an analysis of the lesson learned, and a Student
Version for use in the classroom that omits that appendix.
The Full Version is for general distribution to anyone interested in reading about the
involvement of nonprofit organizations in advocacy. The Student Version is for
classroom work. In addition, the background paper that accompanies the case
studies, Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy, can be assigned to provide students with
the theoretical context for analyzing the cases.
Students who are assigned the case study should work under an honor system and
not consult the Full Version until after the classroom discussion.
Teaching Notes are available that provide instructors with additional information on
how to use the cases, study questions for classroom discussions or assessment
assignments and an analysis of the lessons learned for all three cases.
For copies of all three cases, the background paper Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy
and information on how to obtain the Teaching Notes, visit the New York City
Advocacy Case Studies website:
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/CaseStudies.php
ii
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. iv
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT …………………………………………………………. v
ROBERT STERLING CLARK FOUNDATION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. v
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES ……………. vi
CASE STUDY
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE — BUILDING AND
SUSTAINING COALITIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
BACKGROUND TO SOLID WASTE ISSUES IN NEW YORK ……………………………………………………………. 1
ADVOCACY ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES …………………………………………………………………….. 4
ADVOCACY STRATEGIES ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………100
APPENDIX I – LESSONS LEARNED ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
APPENDIX II – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND MEDIA COVERAGE …………………………….. 14
APPENDIX III – DESCRIPTION OF ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS AND COALITIONS
HIGHLIGHTED IN THE CASE STUDY ……………………………..…… ………………………………………….17
A video of the nonprofit advocates highlighted in this case study discussing their role
in the advocacy campaign is available at: http://usqproductions.com/media/baruch
A background paper, Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy, explores the definitions of
advocacy, the strategic choices organizations make when planning advocacy
campaigns and the difficulties of evaluating the outcomes.
The cases consist of a written narrative and accompanying videos of nonprofit
advocates discussing their work. Also available are Teaching Notes that provide
instructors with additional information on how to use the cases, study questions for
classroom discussions or assessment assignments and an analysis of the lessons
learned for all three cases. All documents and links to additional materials are
available on the NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES website at:
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/CaseStudies.php
iii
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Contributors
The case studies in this series were written by John Casey and Apurva Mehrotra of the
Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management in the School of Public Affairs, Baruch
College.
The authors would like to thank David Birdsell, Dean of the School of Public Affairs, Jack
Krauskopf, the Director of the Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management, Margaret
Ayers, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation and
Laura Wolff, Senior Program Officer of the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation for their
support and encouragement during this project.
Our thanks also to all the interviewees for their generosity with their time and ideas.
The videos for the multimedia support were produced by Union Square Productions.
Funding
Funding for the project was provided by the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation.
iv
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
The School of Public Affairs (SPA) at Baruch College launched the Center for Nonprofit
Strategy and Management (CNSM) to address the needs of nonprofit organizations that are
pivotal to the health and well-being of New York City. The CNSM community of professors
and practitioners takes seriously the relationship between research and practice—practice
informs the faculty’s development of theory as much as theory informs their approach to
practice. Faculty members engage directly and vigorously with area nonprofits and the
institutions that support them and command a wide range of expertise. The School has
substantial strength in organization theory, budgeting and finance, public communication,
advocacy and lobbying, technology diffusion, population studies, strategic planning, housing
policy, human services management, and health care policy.
SPA and the CNSM offer a wide range of academic and non-credit programs and services
that address the complex issues facing the nonprofit sector, including strengthening
leadership and building a pipeline of future leaders. These programs include a Master of
Public Administration with a concentration in nonprofit management, monthly seminars for
nonprofit professionals, conferences, the annual Consulting Day, the annual nonprofit
executive outlook survey, the Emerging Leaders Program, and support for and collaboration
with various “umbrella organizations.”
For more information about SPA and CNSM see:
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/home.php
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/index.ph
v
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ROBERT STERLING CLARK FOUNDATION
The Robert Sterling Clark Foundation supports advocacy through its program on
“Improving the Performance of Public Institutions.” The underlying premise of the
Foundation’s interest in government performance is that government agencies and
employees will deliver better services in a more cost-effective manner if their activities are
scrutinized, evaluated, and held up to public view. While there are a number of public
sector entities that monitor government spending, we believe that outside organizations
play a critical role in examining existing policies and programs, identifying deficiencies, and
promoting reforms that are responsive to changing societal needs. At times, this function
has been carried out by the press, but for persistent attention to complex social problems
and public bureaucracies, we have come to rely on non-profit organizations that make use
of the following strategies to advance the public good:





Conducting research to determine the efficacy of government programs;
Communicating information about government performance and policy options to
the media, policymakers, and the general public;
Organizing citizens to bring collective pressure on public agencies to be responsive;
Helping government officials develop and implement sound policies and programs;
and
Litigating when government agencies are not complying with applicable laws, and
other actions fail to improve their performance.
The Foundation’s focus on advocacy also reflects our desire to maximize the impact of our
limited philanthropic dollars. By influencing government policies and programs, our
grantees affect the expenditure of millions of dollars in public funds–an impact many times
the size of our grants budget. As exemplified by the three case studies presented in this
series, our Public Institutions program supports advocacy efforts across a wide range of
issue areas.
We recognize that government affects the wellbeing of the entire public by shaping the
physical and environmental characteristics of the communities in which we live. Thus our
grantmaking supports efforts to improve city and state policies in areas such as solid waste
management, land use planning, and government operations, with particular attention to
their impact on low-income communities.
Policy change rarely happens quickly or easily. As the case studies demonstrate, it often
requires years of class action litigation and persistent monitoring of government agencies,
advocacy, and public engagement activities. To mount these kinds of long-term campaigns,
advocates need long-term funding. Over a 30-year period, the Foundation awarded a total
of $2 million to the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense
Fund, and additional grants to allied groups, for their work to reform New York City’s solid
waste management policies and programs.
vi
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES
The Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management has developed three multi-media case
studies on landmark attempts by nonprofit organizations to drive policy changes on key
issues in New York City. The three issues are:
Case 1: Solid Waste Management and Environmental Justice. This case examines
the continuing work of community-based organizations and public interest lawyers to
promote equitable and environmentally sound solutions to waste handling in New
York City.
Case 2: Child Welfare/Foster Care. This case study focuses on the campaign to
eliminate racial and religious bias from the New York City foster care system, to
protect children in foster care from abuse and neglect, and to improve child welfare
services.
Case 3: Education Finance Equity. This case study examines the advocacy work in
support of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York (1993) that brought
together a coalition of education advocacy groups, parent organizations, and
community school boards to push for more equitable funding of NYC schools.
The three cases document the background of the advocacy campaigns, identify the
outcomes and impacts, analyze the role of the advocacy organizations and coalitions, and
determine the key factors in the success or failure of the different elements of the
campaigns. They highlight key elements of advocacy campaigns, including: the importance
of grassroots campaigns and building a public constituency; the dynamics of complex
coalitions; the pro and cons of litigation as an advocacy strategy; the role of policy research;
and the importance of and preparing for a long-term commitment.
The cases are multi-media, with written narratives and accompanying videos of interviews
with the advocates highlighted in the cases. The case narratives describe the unfolding of
the events, identify the advocacy strategies used by the nonprofit organizations, and analyze
the major lessons learned. Each case has an appendix with links to supplementary online
documentation and to numerous examples of print and visual media coverage of the issues.
An additional background paper, Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy, explores definitions of
advocacy and the challenges in evaluating the outcomes of advocacy campaigns. Also
available are Teaching Notes that provide instructors with additional information on how to
use the cases, study questions for classroom discussions or assessment assignments, and an
analysis of the lessons learned for each of the three case studies.
vii
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CASE STUDY 1
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
BUILDING AND SUSTAINING COALITIONS
ABSTRACT
This case study examines the continuing work of community-based organizations and
public interest lawyers to promote equitable and environmentally sound solutions to solid
waste handling in New York City.
The case highlights the importance of grassroots campaigns and policy research, as well as
the dynamics of complex coalitions.
BACKGROUND TO SOLID WASTE ISSUES IN NEW YORK
New York City has a long history of advocacy around solid waste issues. When the proposal
to create a landfill at Fresh Kills in the borough of Staten Island leaked to the public early in
1946, local residents stormed to Manhattan and staged the biggest protest City Hall had
seen. Robert Moses, the powerful City Planning Commissioner, promised that it was to be a
“clean fill” and would only be open for three years. Instead, Fresh Kills stayed open for
nearly 60 years and grew to be the largest landfill in the world, receiving, at its peak, as
much as 29,000 tons of trash per day.
From the time Fresh Kills opened in 1947 until the mid-1980s, the city’s Department of
Sanitation trucks that collected residential and institutional waste, and the privately owned
trucks that collected non-residential (or “commercial”) waste, would take their loads to one
of eight marine transfer stations (three each in Manhattan and Brooklyn, and one each in
the Bronx and Queens) where the trash would be put on barges headed for Staten Island.
In 1987, in an effort to prolong the life of Fresh Kills, the city raised tipping fees, the price
charged to private waste haulers for unloading at the marine transfer stations. In response
to the price increase, private companies started building small land-based transfer stations
where commercial waste was transferred to trucks for road transport to dump sites outside
of New York City. This new, poorly regulated waste transfer industry produced dozens of
facilities, located predominantly in industrial zones neighboring residential areas such as
Williamsburg-Greenpoint, Brooklyn and Hunts Point in the Bronx, which were low-income
communities of color. The facilities were loathed by nearby residents who were subjected
to the sights, sounds, and smells of thousands of tons of waste being driven in and out of
their neighborhoods.
1
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
With Staten Islanders clamoring to close Fresh Kills and residents of the neighborhoods
plagued by waste transfer stations seeking relief, the Department of Sanitation began to
explore new ways to deal with the city’s waste. Recycling and other waste reduction
strategies emerged as major issues, but the most vocal debates were over proposals to burn
trash in incinerators. The incinerators would produce energy that could be added to the
power grid and supporters emphasized these waste-to-energy advantages, but opponents
argued that the emissions from such facilities would create unacceptable health risks and
environmental groups have continued to fight against their construction in New York City.
In 1996, Governor Pataki and Mayor Giuliani announced that the Fresh Kills landfill would
close and that use of the marine transfer stations would be phased out by the end of 2001.
The announcement was the result of a compromise deal in the State Legislature in which
Democrats agreed to close the landfill in the Republican stronghold of Staten Island, while
Republicans agreed to support the ban sought by Democratic legislators on the proposed
waste-to-energy incinerators. But the deal begged the question of where the thousands of
tons of garbage going to Fresh Kills every day would go after the landfill’s closure. The
Department of Sanitation’s short-term plan involved contracting with private companies
who would haul the garbage to out-of-state landfills. This, however, meant an even greater
reliance on the private waste transfer stations and an exacerbation of the negative
environmental and public health effects certain communities were facing. Residents
already exposed to the consequences of living in environments polluted by garbage and
thousands of diesel fuel-spewing trucks were about to get even more exposure to the city’s
waste. The Department of Sanitation, with the urging and support of local communities and
advocacy groups, worked on crafting a long-term plan that would lessen the overall
environmental impact of the city’s waste.
In 2006, the City Council and State Department of Environmental Conservation approved
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s Solid Waste Management Plan (SWMP). The previous SWMP,
passed in 1992, had been updated and modified in 1996 and 2000, but was not
implemented effectively by the Giuliani administration and was still not satisfactory to
many community advocates. The 2006 SWMP reinforced the city’s commitment to
recycling by setting ambitious new goals and proposing two new recycling facilities. It
detailed a system of waste collection and export that relied less on trucks and more on
barge and rail, and made each borough more or less responsible for its own waste. A critical
component of the new plan was to re-open four of the marine transfer stations that were
closed along with Fresh Kills, and it was proposed that they would handle commercial as
well as residential waste. The plan received widespread support and acceptance from the
neighborhood civic groups and environmental advocacy organizations that had fought for
environmental justice in New York City.
The following table highlights some of the key events in the city’s path to a new solid waste
management plan (Table 1).
2
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Table 1: Timeline of Key Events
Year
19841985
1987
1989
1990
1992
1996
1998
2000
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
Event
New York City plans to reduce dependence on Fresh Kills by building new waste-toenergy incinerators in each borough. Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) releases
report, “To Burn or Not to Burn,” helping slow the move towards incineration.
City raised tipping fees and land-based waste transfer stations begin to open in
industrially zoned waterfront communities.
Local Law 19 is passed creating citywide recycling program and establishing the
Citywide Recycling Advisory Board (CRAB).
Local Law 40 is passed, mandating that the Department of Sanitation adopt siting
regulations to prevent clustering of waste transfer stations.
After Mayor Giuliani cuts the recycling budget, CRAB releases “Recycle First” report to
push for funding of the recycling program.
The City Council approves a long-term SWMP with a significant recycling component,
aimed at reducing reliance on incinerators.
Mayor Giuliani and Governor Pataki announce that Fresh Kills will close as of December
31, 2001.
Natural Resources Defense Council sues the city after Mayor Giuliani slashes the city’s
recycling budget.
The city releases a report, “2001 and Beyond: A Proposed Plan for Replacing the Fresh
Kills Landfill.” The proposal to build three large Enclosed Barge Unloading Facilities
(EBUFs) is criticized by community groups because the facilities would be run by
private companies and could potentially serve as regional transfer stations for cities and
states outside of New York.
The Organization of Waterfront Neighborhoods (OWN)/Consumers Union release the
“Taking Out the Trash” report, calling on the city to utilize network of existing marine
transfer stations.
A modification is made to the 1992 SWMP, proposing ways to make the system more
equitable, including reuse of existing marine transfer stations and a substantial waste
prevention and recycling component.
Mayor Bloomberg submits a new SWMP to the City Council, featuring a plan to retrofit
and reopen four marine transfer stations.
The Uniformed Land Use Review Process (ULURP) applications for the marine transfer
stations pass in the City Council, approving the retrofitting and reopening of four
marine transfer stations.
Mayor Bloomberg’s SWMP is adopted by the City Council and approved by the State
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).
The State Senate and Assembly approve the Gansevoort Marine Transfer Station, a
recycling center which needed state approval because of the Hudson River Park Act that
designated the area for park development.
The city creates Community Advisory Groups (CAGs) to represent communities that will
host new facilities.
The New York State DEC approves the reopening of the 91st street marine transfer
station, following years of petitions and appeals by a group of area residents known as
the Gracie Point Community Council.
3
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ADVOCACY ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES
In the last decade and a half, the advocacy efforts of environmental justice organizations
focused on the fact that a disproportionate amount of the city’s trash was being handled by
a small number of community districts, generally low-income communities of color.
According to a joint statement issued in 2005 by the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the New York League of Conservation
Voters (NYLCV), the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA), and the
Organization of Waterfront Neighborhoods, more than 80% of the City’s trash was trucked,
stored, and then bundled for interstate transport in just four out of 59 community districts.
The South Bronx, where just 6.5% of the city’s population resides, was home to 15 waste
transfer stations and handled over 31% of the city’s solid waste. Not coincidentally, the
South Bronx had one of the highest asthma rates in the world. Communities neighboring
waste transfer stations were forced to deal with the noise pollution emitted from large
trucks, damaged and overcrowded roads, and the noxious air and odors that emanated from
the trucks and facilities. Advocates sought to limit the number of transfer stations in any
one neighborhood and minimize the negative impact facilities had on area residents.
Environmental organizations such as EDF and NRDC had been active in advocacy around
solid waste management well before the issue of transfer stations started gaining attention.
For years prior, they had been attempting to convince the city to handle its waste in a more
environmentally sound manner through various waste reduction strategies, including
recycling.
No to Incineration, Yes to Recycling
In the mid-1980s, facing the reality of a landfill filling up too quickly, the city began to enact
policies that did not sit well with environmental organizations. As part of its effort to
lengthen the lifespan of Fresh Kills, the city began to look at new avenues for disposing of its
waste, including expanding waste-to-energy incineration. While the city was moving ahead
with plans to open at least one waste-to-energy facility in each borough, environmental
advocates were putting together reports and testifying at administrative hearings that
incineration was not an environmentally sound or economically efficient means of
disposing of the city’s trash. Meanwhile, EDF, NRDC and other organizations were pushing
for a comprehensive recycling program as part of the alternative to incineration.
State solid waste management legislation in 1987, which put recycling higher than
incineration on a list of priorities for waste handling, was on the side of the city’s recycling
advocates. Plans for a proposed waste-to-energy facility in Brooklyn were stymied by a
court ruling that under the state law the city would have to implement a recycling program
before it could build any new incinerators. In 1989, NYC Local Law 19 was passed,
establishing a recycling program that aimed to recycle 25% of the city’s residential waste by
the mid-1990s, and waste-to-energy was put on the back burner. According to EDF lawyer
Jim Tripp, NRDC’s work to rally support for the recycling initiative along with EDF’s
technical and legal work at administrative proceedings on potential new incinerators were
critical in ensuring the passage of the recycling program. Shortly after the law was passed,
4
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Mayor Giuliani attempted to significantly reduce the budget for the recycling program, but
advocates resisted, and in 1992 the Citywide Recycling Advisory Board released a report
titled “Recycle First.” Four years later, another attempt by Giuliani to slash the recycling
program’s budget resulted in a lawsuit by NRDC.
The Dilemma over Transfer Stations
While recycling advocates battled the city over implementation and funding of the recycling
program, the inequitable burden of waste disposal on certain communities started gaining
more attention. In the industrial areas of the South Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens, dozens of
waste transfer stations were being opened and operated with little regulation. Eddie
Bautista, a long-time environmental advocate who is currently coordinator of NYC-EJA
notes that, “You had enormous construction and demolition debris transfer stations that
would be spewing toxic construction dust. You could go on a building in Williamsburg and
look and see a half-mile away a plume of dust hanging over and you knew that was the
transfer station.” It was not only the waste transfer stations that negatively affected these
communities, but also the truck traffic associated with them. Large, diesel trucks would
often wait in queues for hours to enter a facility, all the while emitting toxic fumes and
noxious odors that constituted an environmental and health hazard for nearby residents.
For those considering new plans to deal with the city’s waste, reducing the reliance on landbased waste transfer stations was a top priority.
The fact that the communities exposed to these hazards were exclusively low-income
communities of color raised the ire of activists and advocates. It was not difficult to
recognize the common theme among the neighborhoods that were being overrun with
waste transfer stations. According to Gavin Kearney of New York Lawyers for the Public
Interest (NYLPI), “People just started to connect dots that weren’t that hard to connect.
When you see folks in Red Hook and in the South Bronx and in Williamsburg and
Greenpoint all have the same thing happening at the same time, people started realizing
that there were larger systemic forces in operation.”
While waste transfer stations had many negative impacts on nearby residents, they were in
fact operating in industrial areas designated for such use. “It was in their neighborhood but
it was also in the neighborhood it was supposed to be in; by the zoning map it was an
industrial zone,” says Walter Czwartacky of the Department of Sanitation. The fact that so
many residents live in and around such industrial zones and that many of these
communities are poor communities of color is a reality that many urban areas are forced to
deal with. Czwartacky acknowledges that the Department of Sanitation did not have the
proper rules and regulations in place for the siting and operation of transfer stations in
1987, when the raising of tipping fees increased demand for such facilities. But he stresses
that the Department has constantly sought to create a fairer and more equitable waste
disposal system.
A Citywide Alliance
Zoning resolutions meant little to the residents of communities where dozens of waste
transfer stations operated. Regardless of whether the transfer stations were technically
5
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
where they were supposed to be, residents of the affected communities felt they were being
overburdened by a disproportionate share of the city’s garbage. In 1990, when waste
transfer stations were being opened one after the other, clustered in certain communities
and operating without adequate regulation, community groups applied pressure on the city
to address the issue. The City Council passed Local Law 40 mandating the Department of
Sanitation to adopt siting regulations for transfer stations to ensure that large numbers of
unwanted facilities would not be clustered in the same few neighborhoods. In 1991, some
of these neighborhood groups joined together to create the NYC-EJA.
After the announcement was made that the Fresh Kills landfill would be closing, community
groups grew concerned that there would be a greater reliance on private transfer stations
to handle even more of the city’s waste than they had up to that point. In 1997, as the waste
transfer station issue continued to negatively affect communities, NYC-EJA, its member
groups, NYLPI, and other affiliate groups created the Organization of Waterfront
Neighborhoods (OWN), a citywide coalition of over 20 neighborhood groups that sought to
end the inequitable burden their communities faced in dealing with the city’s waste. “From
1990 to 1996 we worked on application by application, neighborhood by neighborhood,
fighting facility by facility. It wasn’t until ‘96 that we had a cohesive city wide policy that
tied everyone together,” says Eddie Bautista, one of the co-founders of OWN.
With technical assistance from NYLPI, NYC-EJA, and the Consumers Union, OWN set out to
advance its own solid waste management plan. In 2000, it released “Taking Out the Trash,”
a report calling on the city to utilize the marine transfer stations slated for closure along
with Fresh Kills so that the city would be less dependent on truck-based export and each
borough would handle its fair share of waste. For OWN, there were several benefits of
going back to the city’s old infrastructure of marine transfer stations and shipping waste by
barge. Each barge could haul the equivalent of close to two dozen trucks worth of waste,
significantly reducing the presence and impact of truck traffic on affected communities.
Bautista also felt that by maintaining control over the city’s infrastructure and waste
management processes, rather than allowing private companies to do the job, the city
would be able to incentivize recycling in a way that private companies would not.
While the leadership of OWN was drafting its own solid waste proposal, its member groups
were active in their individual communities. The community groups recruited
neighborhood residents to attend marches and flood council meetings and environmental
hearings with their concerns over truck traffic and the consequences it produced. One such
group, OUTRAGE (Organizations United for Trash Reduction and Garbage Equity),
represented the Williamsburg-Greenpoint section of Brooklyn where over 40% of the city’s
garbage was processed. UPROSE (United Puerto Rican Association of Sunset Park)
represented neighborhoods in Southwest Brooklyn which was home to several waste
transfer stations. Groups such as OUTRAGE and UPROSE played a crucial role in educating
their communities on environmental justice issues and utilizing community support and
action to influence city council members.
6
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
The New Plan
According to Department of Sanitation officials, the need for a more sustainable and
equitable solution to the city’s solid waste problem was not something that advocates
needed to remind them of. For years, the agency had been attempting to find alternative
means of waste disposal as it phased out the use of Fresh Kills. In the short term, the
Department of Sanitation established contracts to have the waste trucked out of town,
primarily utilizing the private transfer stations that had been handling much of the city’s
commercial waste. An initial long term plan that envisioned three new regional transfer
stations was met with resistance from advocates and their partners in the City Council who
insisted that any new plan address the issue of borough equity. The 2000 modification to
the 1992 SWMP focused on making the waste transport and disposal system an
economically sustainable one while also taking the load off of overburdened communities. It
included some of the same measures that would be critical components of the 2006 plan,
including utilizing existing marine transfer stations and a focus on waste prevention and
recycling.
By the time of OWN’s “Taking Out the Trash” report and the SWMP modification in 2000,
the larger environmental organizations had begun to take notice of the waste transfer
station problem and the issue of environmental justice. EDF’s Jim Tripp recalls meeting
Paul Lipson of the Hunts Point Community Development Corporation in the Bronx and
looking at a waste transfer station and a sewage treatment plant on the waterfront. “[He]
said to me ‘Manhattan gets parks and we get Manhattan’s waste’ and that really stuck in me.
That really catalyzed in my mind that this was unfair. It was outrageous.” In 2004, EDF
released “Trash and the City,” a report that outlined ten possible scenarios in which various
combinations of old transfer stations could be re-opened in order to significantly reduce the
number of miles driven by trucks hauling the city’s garbage.
In 2006, Mayor Bloomberg’s SWMP, which borrowed heavily from the plans promoted by
advocates, was approved. A Mayoral inter-agency task force that included the Department
of Sanitation, the Economic Development Corporation, the Office of Management and
Budget, and representatives from the Mayor’s office worked with groups such as OWN and
EDF to iron out the details of infrastructure and to make the plan as economically and
environmentally efficient as possible. The 2006 SWMP included the re-opening of four
marine transfer stations to handle the city’s residential garbage, use of the existing West
59th Street marine transfer station for Manhattan’s commercial waste, and the conversion of
an old marine transfer station at the Gansevoort Pier in Manhattan into a recycling center.
The plan also included proposals for the city to utilize existing private transfer stations
which would be converted from truck to rail and barge-based export facilities. After years
of task force reports, solid waste plans and plan modifications, lawsuits, protests, hearings,
meetings, and administrative proceedings, the Department of Sanitation and the City of New
York had created a plan that responded to many of the concerns of environmental and
environmental justice advocates.
7
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ADVOCACY STRATEGIES
Advocates in New York City have utilized a variety of strategies to influence solid waste and
environmental justice policies over the past several decades, including the most recent
SWMP.
Legal and Legislative Strategies
When financial constraints compelled Mayor Giuliani to slash the budget for the city’s
recycling program, NRDC successfully sued the city, forcing it to fund the program so that it
could meet the goals established in Local Law 19. Litigation was also used by NYLPI when
the Department of Sanitation did not implement Local Law 40, the city law that required the
city agency to adopt regulations regarding the siting and operation of waste transfer
stations. The effectiveness of litigation as a strategy is often determined by how binding the
terms of the law are. Speaking of NRDC’s lawsuit to enforce the recycling law, Goldstein
comments, “We anticipated that we would have to go to court to enforce this and if we had
that mandatory language in the statute we thought we would have a chance of winning.”
Research and Policy Analysis
Advocates relied heavily on research and technical reports, along with testimony at
administrative proceedings, to propose alternative methods of waste export and influence
the discussion of solid waste policy. The reports, “To Burn or Not to Burn” (1985) and
“Recycle First” (1992) offered both environmental and economic rationales for moving
away from incineration and towards increased recycling. OWN raised over $100,000 to hire
experts in the field of public health and environmental engineering, lawyers, and other
consultants to help prepare the 2000 “Taking Out the Trash” report, which was among the
first calls to retrofit the city’s existing network of marine transfer stations. EDF’s “Trash
and the City” also called for many of the changes that were included in the 2006 SWMP. “It’s
important to do good technical work and have that capacity; maybe not always to influence
the general public but in terms of being able to persuade decision makers in the private
sector or in the government to rethink something,” says Tripp.
Coalition Building and Capacity Development
There were multiple organizations involved in the effort to shape a new SWMP and the
broad-based coalition was critical in achieving their goals. Capitalizing on its strengths and
past experience, EDF continued to issue technical reports on ways to minimize the
environmental harms caused by waste transport and disposal while NRDC focused much of
its energy on the recycling issue. OWN, with assistance from NYC-EJA and NYLPI, made the
environmental justice issue its primary focus of concern.
While individual groups often worked separately, and on separate issues, each organization
ultimately supported the work of the others, and their combined voices heightened
attention to each individual organization’s concerns. “The usual pattern of activity in these
campaigns is such that the groups get together early on, sit down, and figure out what their
8
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
priorities are, figure out what resources they have, and either divide up issues or sub-issues
or find a way to work together to be mutually supportive even as they’re going down
parallel tracks,” says Goldstein. Letters to city and state officials were often signed by
multiple parties, and rallies to inform the community and gather support were sponsored
not only by the neighborhood organizations of OWN, but by citywide organizations such as
NYLPI and NYLCV.
The coalition formed around the solid waste issue was not only critical in the formulation of
a new SWMP, but also in ensuring that it could be enacted and its provisions implemented.
When the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) application for the marine transfer
station on East 91st street in Manhattan was facing defeat in the City Council, advocates
teamed up to secure the votes needed to pass it. “You had a productive coalition between
environmental justice groups and mainstream environmental groups who don’t always
work together harmoniously. We’d go in and they’d hear from environmental justice
groups. And they would come in and they’d hear from environmental groups. Each of us
gave credence to the other,” says Kearney.
Community Support and Direct Action
Building community support was also crucial to the advocacy work on solid waste
management. Getting residents to turn out for City Council hearings, and to be involved in
the environmental review process for individual facilities, ensured fair media coverage and
put pressure on elected officials. “When we get 40 or 50 people packed into a small City
Council committee hearing it really changes the dynamic of what’s going on there,” says
Kearney. Grassroots organizations such as OUTRAGE and UPROSE also utilized community
participation to make sure their voices were heard. Wearing bright yellow t-shirts
identifying the organization, OUTRAGE attended City Council meetings and organized
marches along truck routes that gave a voice to their community. UPROSE coordinated
environmental justice tours with the White House Council on Environmental Quality and
the U.S.E.P.A. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, putting federal pressure on
city officials to prioritize environmental justice in a new solid waste plan.
Consultative and Advisory Committees
The establishment of advisory committees was a key element in the formulation of new
SWMPs. In the 1980s, Solid Waste Advisory Boards (SWABs) were set up in each borough
under the guidance of the borough president. The SWABs were an integral part of the push
towards recycling and away from incineration.
From the beginning, prominent
environmental advocates were key members of these boards. Manhattan Borough
President David Dinkins asked Jim Tripp from EDF to be the first chair of his SWAB. The
1989 recycling law set up a Citywide Recycling Advisory Board (CRAB), which advocated
strongly to keep the recycling program afloat amidst budget cuts and incorporated funding
for the recycling program into the 1992 SWMP. As part of the 2006 SWMP, Community
Advisory Groups (CAGs) were set up to provide input to the city administration on
community concerns about the new waste transfer facilities. Advocacy organizations such
as NRDC, NYLPI and member organizations of OWN were represented on these committees
9
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CONCLUSIONS
The effectiveness of the environmental justice advocacy campaign is reflected in the
provisions of the 2006 SWMP. Over-burdened communities will benefit from the switch to
a rail and barge-based waste management system, and from provisions that ensure each
borough will handle its fair share of waste. The SWMP has been approved and has received
widespread support from environmental and environmental justice groups, but its
implementation will not necessarily come easily, as evidenced by the continued opposition
to the East 91st Street marine transfer station, as well as to the other key Manhattan facility,
the Gansevoort Pier recycling center. Those who advocated for borough equity and
increased recycling will have to continue to apply pressure on decision makers, utilize their
expertise, and litigate if necessary. “We never mistake the difference between getting a plan
enacted and thinking we’ve actually accomplished real on the street change,” says Goldstein.
Oversight of the implementation is a long-term project. Alison Cordero, the coordinator of
OUTRAGE, was happy the day the Mayor opened the waste export rail facility in her
neighborhood as it will take many eighteen-wheeler trucks full of garbage off the streets,
but she also notes that: “You win a big victory in 2006, but we probably won’t see most of
the results until 2013, so one of the big challenges is keeping people organized and
interested over a 7 year period when you don’t see a lot of results. At a recent meeting, one
of the senior citizens who was involved in the original truck survey back in 2003-2004 said
to me ‘Yeah, I remember that. I remember I sat out here with Tina and checked off lots of
numbers and wrote down lots of things — so what’s gonna happen?’’’
10
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
APPENDIX I – LESSONS LEARNED
Note: The following sections focus on the most salient lessons of this particular case study.
As the lessons learned in the other two case studies in the series may also be applicable
here, readers are encouraged to look at those cases and at the background paper
Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy.
The Importance of “Framing” Debates
Decisions about the focus of advocacy and about language used can be crucial to a
campaign’s success. In the 1980s, the major environmental groups in New York
emphasized recycling and waste reduction, but in the 1990s waste transfer stations and the
inequitable burden of waste disposal also became key issues. Largely due to the work of
smaller grassroots environmental justice organizations, the larger organizations broadened
their focus, reflecting both their increased understanding of, and commitment to, justice
issues, but also their recognition of the need to build broader community support for their
ongoing advocacy around waste reduction and recycling.
When new incineration facilities were planned as part of the solution for waste
management, proponents framed the proposals in terms of the waste-to-energy advantages,
while opponents spoke focused on the toxic emissions that would result and the subsequent
health risks. In the continuing advocacy around recycling issues, advocates focus on the
positive environmental outcomes and long-terms economic benefits, while opponents
emphasize short-terms costs and cast recycling as a luxury the city simply can’t afford.
The Importance of Coalitions
A key strategy in the advocacy around solid waste issues was the creation of a coalition that
brought together disparate groups, from national environmental organizations to small
neighborhood community groups. The world of solid waste policy in New York City
encompasses such a broad range of issues and interests that it was impossible for any one
organization to tackle them all, so the coalition ensured that different interests were
addressed by those that had the most commitment to them. All members of a coalition will
not necessarily have all of the same specific goals, but the likelihood of a campaign’s success
increases when a range of partners can rally around a broader vision. According to
Goldstein, “one of the important elements in building a successful coalition is to be able to
mutually agree to set aside the differences and keep the big picture in mind and advance the
big picture.” The coalition helped ensure that a wide range of organizations were able to
speak with one voice when it was needed.
Coalition Members will have Different, Sometimes Competing, Interests
While advocacy groups that form a coalition usually share a broad vision, each group has
not only its own area of expertise, but its own interests. In the case of solid waste
11
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
management in New York City, advocacy groups were fortunate that their interests
generally did not clash with those of their coalition partners and that each group could
support the other without compromising its own aims. But there will be differences and as
a campaign evolves, some groups may end up “changing sides”, particularly as interim
victories are won and some advocates may then have to defend them against former allies
who have divergent interests, or against emerging groups that oppose the new situation.
The 2006 SWMP was seen as a major achievement by many advocacy groups as it would
lead to a more equitable distribution of waste management facilities. But Manhattan
residents living near the proposed 91st street facility formed the Gracie Point Community
Council and pushed their City Council representative to oppose construction.
Environmental justice advocates, who as “outsiders” had to convince the city of the merits
of their ideas, now find themselves in the position of defending the SWMP and warding off
the efforts of community groups opposed to the outcomes.
Size and Structures Matter
The different organizations that constituted the coalitions illustrate the range of resources
and legal structures often needed to ensure successful advocacy outcomes. National
environmental organizations, such as EDF and NRDC with annual operating budgets of close
to $100 million, provided the essential staffing and expertise needed for the prolonged
campaigns; New York based public interest groups such as NYPLI and NYLCV were able to
help manage the local political and administrative context, while small neighborhood
groups and their coalitions such as OWN ensured community support and local grassroots
legitimacy. Organizational forms vary, with many of the advocacy organizations using both
501(c)3 and 501(c)4 affiliates to enable them to raise funds and conduct the full range of
activities necessary, while some groups remained as unincorporated coordination entities.
A Range of Advocacy Activities are Required
The advocacy work around solid waste issues demonstrated the full range of activities that
are required to achieve campaign goals. Legal challenges, policy research, submissions
testimony to council hearings, public awareness campaigns, street demonstrations, and
participation in government advisory committees are all part of the toolkit of advocates,
and even within a single strategy area different levels of work are required. The materials
cited in the Appendix give some sense of the extent of the work involved in environmental
justice advocacy, but they are only a relatively small sample of the outputs generated during
the campaigns.
There will be Competing Claims about who Achieved the Changes
Once a change takes place, many people and organizations can claim credit. Advocacy
groups insist their campaigns lead to change, while government agencies assert that the
changes resulted from their own internal capacity to address problems and respond to
residents’ needs. Department of Sanitation officials insist that they had been paying the
appropriate amount of attention to solid waste management issues all along and that the
eventual plan would have come to fruition regardless of advocacy efforts. Environmental
12
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
advocates, on the other hand, claim that the City and the Department was slow to move on
the issue of borough equity at best, and neglected it altogether at worst, and that the
Department was never particularly enthusiastic about recycling and waste reduction and
that it dragged its feet on implementation of such initiatives.
13
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
APPENDIX II – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND MEDIA COVERAGE
Documents
City of New York, Department of Sanitation. Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Plan.
September 2006. Available at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/html/swmp/swmp4oct.shtml
Citywide Recycling Advisory Board. Recycle First: A Solid Waste Management Plan for New
York City., 1992. Available at (Executive Summary):
http://geography.hunter.cuny.edu/~mclarke/RF%2091-12-18%20EXEC%20SUM.pdf
Columbia University, Earth Institute, Earth Engineering Center and Center for Urban
Research and Policy. Life After Fresh Kills: Moving Beyond New York City’s Current Waste
Management Plan: Policy, Technical and Environmental Considerations. 2001. Available at:
www.earth.columbia.edu/news/after_fresh_kills.pdf
Environmental Defense Fund. (Authors: Ramon J. Cruz, Thomas Outerbridge, James T.B.
Tripp). Trash and the City (Executive Summary). 2004. Available at:
http://www.edf.org/documents/4185_TrashAndTheCity_ExecSumm.pdf
Environmental Defense Fund (Author: Dan Kirshner). To Burn or Not to Burn: The Economic
Advantages of Recycling over Garbage Incineration for New York City. 1985.
Natural Resources Defense Council and DSM Environmental Services, Inc. Analysis of New
York City Department of Sanitation Curbside Recycling and Refuse Costs. May 2008. Available
at: http://docs.nrdc.org/cities/files/cit_08052801A.pdf
Natural Resources Defense Council (Authors: Mark A. Izeman Virali Gokaldas). Recycling
Returns: Ten Reforms for Making New York City’s Recycling Program More Cost-Effective.
April 2004. Available at: www.nrdc.org/cities/recycling/returns/returns.pdf
Consumers Union and Organization of Waterfront Neighborhoods (Author: Barbara
Warren). Taking out the Trash: A New Direction for New York City’s Waste. May 31, 2000.
Available at: http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/trash%20report.pdf
News Coverage – Print
Amateau, Albert. Neighbors, Electeds Trash Gansevoort Transfer Plan. The Villager.
September 2006. Available at:
http://www.thevillager.com/villager_177/neighborselecteds.html
Brustein, Joshua. The Mayor’s New Garbage Plan. Gotham Gazette. October 18, 2004.
Available at: http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20041018/200/1151
14
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Eddings, Amy. Waste Facilities a Blight for Brooklyn Residents. WNYC. December 19, 2008.
Available at: http://www.wnyc.org/news/articles/119042.
Gross, Courtney. Latest Round in the Garbage Wars. Gotham Gazette. June 2007. Available
at: http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/environment/20070618/7/2206
Gross, Courtney. Recycling Starts and Stops. Gotham Gazette. January 14, 2008. Available at:
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20080114/200/2405.
Harmatz, Jeffrey. Trash Trucks in North Brooklyn are Outrageous. Greenpoint Gazette.
October 22, 2009. Available at: http://www.greenpointnews.com/news/trash-trucks-innorth-brooklyn-are-outrageous
Martin, Douglas. State Cracks Down on New York City Trash Transfer Sites. New York Times.
May 14, 1999. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/14/nyregion/statecracks-down-on-new-york-city-trash-transfer-stations.html?pagewanted=1
Urbina, Ian. 20-Year Plan for City’s Trash Entails $340 Million Renovation of 4 Marine
Transfer Stations. New York Times. October 8, 2004. Available at:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9806E6DE153BF93BA35753C1A9629C8
B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
News Coverage – Television/Video
City Council Votes in Favor of Mayor’s Trash Plan. NY1 News. July 20, 2006. Available at:
http://www.ny1.com/1-all-boroughs-news-content/61166/city-council-votes-in-favor-ofmayor-s-trash-plan
City Kicks off New Rail Waste Transfer Program. NY1 News. April 17, 2007. Available at:
http://www.ny1.com/1-all-boroughs-news-content/68833/city-kicks-off-new-rail-wastetransfer-program
City Residents Face-Off over Proposed Waste Management Site. NY1 News. June 12, 2007.
Available from http://www.ny1.com/1-all-boroughs-news-content/70659/city-residentsface-off-over-proposed-waste-management-site
City’s Trash Plan Runs into More Opposition from New York Residents. NY1 News. February
7, 2006. Available at: http://www.ny1.com/1-all-boroughs-newscontent/top_stories/?SecID=1000&ArID=56935
Senator Lanza Addresses the Issue of Waste Management. Available at:

Trash Hits the Tracks in Brooklyn. NY1 News. March 10, 2009. Available at:
http://www.ny1.com/1-all-boroughs-news-content/95297/trash-hits-the-tracks-inbrooklyn
15
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Additional Documentation on Waste Reduction and Environmental Issues
Marjorie J. Clarke, a professor at Hunter College and an environmental activist who was a
key participant in many of the events covered in this case study has a website Why Waste
NYC? with copies of testimonies, audio files and other documentation about waste reduction
issues at: http://www.maggieclarkeenvironmental.com/
16
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
APPENDIX III –DESCRIPTION OF ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS AND COALITIONS
HIGHLIGHTED IN THE CASE STUDY
The following descriptions provide additional information about the organizations and
coalitions highlighted in this case study.
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
http://www.edf.org/
Since its inception in 1967, the Environmental Defense Fund has used science, economic
incentives, corporate partnerships, and legal expertise to tackle the most serious
environmental issues. Their advocacy efforts have influenced corporate behavior and
Congressional legislation.
EDF is a 501(c)(3) public charity and also operates the Environmental Defense Action Fund,
a 501(c)(4) civic league. Their headquarters in New York City, 10 regional offices around
the US and one regional office in Beijing are home to hundreds of employees. Operating
expenses for 2008 for EDF were $97,004,298 and for the Action Fund $9,245,557.
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
http://www.nrdc.org/
Founded in 1970, The Natural Resources Defense Council has become one of the nation’s
most powerful environmental groups. Combining the use of litigation with the support of
1.3 million members and online activists, they strive to safeguard the earth’s people,
planets, animals, and natural systems. Within seven program areas – Air & Energy, Health,
International, Land, Nuclear, Urban, and Water & Coastal – they engage in critical
environmental battles all over the world. Their work has led to the passage of local and
federal legislation banning harmful substances, improving environmental standards, and
preserving natural landmarks.
NRDC is a 501(c)(3) public charity and also operates the NRDC Action Fund, a 501(c)(4)
civic league. It has a staff of more than 300 lawyers, scientists and policy experts in offices in
New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Beijing. Operating
expenses for NRDC for 2008 were $85,698,623 and for the Action Fund $1,384,879.
New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA)

Founded in 1991, the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance is a citywide network
linking grassroots organizations from low-income neighborhoods and communities of color
in their struggle for environmental justice. NYC-EJA seeks to empower its member
organizations to advocate for improved environmental conditions and against inequitable
environmental burdens. NYC-EJA was incorporated as a 501(c)(3) public charity in 1995. It
is currently undergoing a re-organization, under the direction of its Executive Director
Eddie Bautista.
17
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
New York Lawyers for the Public Interest (NYLPI)
http://www.nylpi.org/
New York Lawyers for the Public Interest is a nonprofit, civil rights firm that partners with
member law firms, corporate law departments, and other organizations to help
underrepresented people develop legal strategies to serve their vision for themselves and
their communities.
NYLPI is a 501(c)(3) public charity that has 30 full-time employees and a small group of
part-time employees and volunteers. Operating expenses for 2008 were $4,474,765.
New York League of Conservation Voters (NYLCV)

The New York League of Conservation Voters advocates for sound environmental policies
and seeks to elect pro-environment candidates who will adopt and implement those
policies. It is affiliated with The New York Conservation Education Fund which fosters open,
non-partisan discussion on environmental policy and empowers New Yorkers to participate
in environmental protection efforts in their communities through candidate debates, public
educational forums, and the publication of citizens’ guides to key environmental issues.
The New York League of Conservation Voters is a 501 (c)(4) organization, while the New
York Conservation Education Fund is a 501(c)(3) public charity. Operating expenses for
2008 for the New York League of Conservation Voters were $781,175 and for The Education
Fund $509,147.
The New York League and the Fund constitute the local chapter of a national federation of
Leagues and Funds, which has its national headquarters in Washington DC and chapters in
34 states, with a combined operating budget of around $40 million.
Organization of Waterfront Neighborhoods (OWN)
(no website)
The Organization of Waterfront Neighborhoods is a citywide community-based coalition
formed in 1997 to address the common threat to New York City neighborhoods presented
by solid waste transfer stations. The coalition’s members, over 20 community-based groups
from the neighborhoods of Greenpoint, Williamsburg, South Bronx, East N.Y., Red Hook,
Sunset Park, Southeast Queens, Washington Heights and Harlem have joined together in an
effort to find an equitable and environmentally sound solution to waste handling in New
York City.
OWN is a coalition of organizations that speaks with the collective voice of its members. It is
not an incorporated or registered organization and does not have a separate legal identity
(although many of the community-based groups it represents are registered). The
administrative capacity of OWN has been housed in the offices of NYLPI.
18
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
ONE BERNARD BARUCH WAY, D – 901
NEW YORK, NEW YORK, 10010
646.660.6700
www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/
135 EAST 64TH STREET
NEW YORK, NY 10065
212.288.8900
http://www.rsclark.org/
January 2011
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative
Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
19
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES
CASE STUDY 2
CHILD WELFARE AND FOSTER CARE REFORM
GOING MAINSTREAM: ADVOCATES TAKE THE REINS
FULL VERSION
NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES
CASE STUDY 2
CHILD WELFARE AND FOSTER CARE REFORM
GOING MAINSTREAM: ADVOCATES TAKE THE REINS
Full Version
This is one of three multimedia cases in the New York City Nonprofit Advocacy Case
Studies series. The case narratives in the series are available in both a Full Version
that includes an appendix with an analysis of the lesson learned, and a Student
Version for use in the classroom that omits that appendix.
The Full Version is for general distribution to anyone interested in reading about the
involvement of nonprofit organizations in advocacy. The Student Version is for
classroom work. In addition, the background paper that accompanies the case
studies, Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy, can be assigned to provide students with
the theoretical context for analyzing the cases.
Students who are assigned the case study should work under an honor system and
not consult the Full Version until after the classroom discussion.
Teaching Notes are available that provide instructors with additional information on
how to use the cases, study questions for classroom discussions or assessment
assignments and an analysis of the lessons learned for all three cases.
For copies of all three cases, the background paper Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy
and information on how to obtain the Teaching Notes, visit the New York City
Advocacy Case Studies website:
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/CaseStudies.php
ii
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. iv
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT …………………………………………………………. v
ROBERT STERLING CLARK FOUNDATION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. v
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES…………….vii
CASE STUDY
CHILD WELFARE AND FOSTER CARE REFORM: GOING MAINSTREAM: ADVOCATES TAKE
THE REINS …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
BACKGROUND TO CHILD WELFARE AND FOSTER CARE ISSUES ……………………………………………. 1
ADVOCACY ON FOSTER CARE ISSUES ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
ADVOCACY STRATEGIES ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 7
CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
APPENDIX I – LESSONS LEARNED ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
APPENDIX II – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND MEDIA COVERAGE……………………………… 14
APPENDIX III –DESCRIPTION OF ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS AND COALITIONS
HIGHLIGHTED IN THE CASE STUDY …………………………………………………………………………………………………..189
A video of the nonprofit advocates highlighted in this case study discussing their role in the
advocacy campaign is available at: http://usqproductions.com/media/baruch
A background paper, Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy, explores the definitions of
advocacy, the strategic choices organizations make when planning advocacy campaigns and
the difficulties of evaluating the outcomes.
The cases consist of a written narrative and accompanying videos of nonprofit advocates
discussing their work. Also available are Teaching Notes that provide instructors with
additional information on how to use the cases, study questions for classroom discussions
or assessment assignments and an analysis of the lessons learned for all three cases.
All documents and links to additional materials are available on the NEW YORK CITY
NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES website at:
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/CaseStudies.php
iii
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Contributors
The case studies in this series were written by John Casey and Apurva Mehrotra of the
Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management in the School of Public Affairs, Baruch
College.
The authors would like to thank David Birdsell, Dean of the School of Public Affairs, Jack
Krauskopf, the Director of the Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management, Margaret
Ayers, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation and
Laura Wolff, Senior Program Officer of the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation for their
support and encouragement during this project.
Our thanks also to all the interviewees for their generosity with their time and ideas.
The videos for the multimedia support were produced by Union Square Productions.
Funding
Funding for the project was provided by the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation.
iv
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
The School of Public Affairs (SPA) at Baruch College launched the Center for Nonprofit
Strategy and Management (CNSM) to address the needs of nonprofit organizations that are
pivotal to the health and well-being of New York City. The CNSM community of professors
and practitioners takes seriously the relationship between research and practice—practice
informs the faculty’s development of theory as much as theory informs their approach to
practice. Faculty members engage directly and vigorously with area nonprofits and the
institutions that support them and command a wide range of expertise. The School has
substantial strength in organization theory, budgeting and finance, public communication,
advocacy and lobbying, technology diffusion, population studies, strategic planning, housing
policy, human services management, and health care policy.
SPA and CNSM offer a wide range of academic and non-credit programs and services that
address the complex issues facing the nonprofit sector, including strengthening leadership
and building a pipeline of future leaders. These programs include a Master of Public
Administration with a concentration in nonprofit management, monthly seminars for
nonprofit professionals, conferences, the annual Consulting Day, the annual nonprofit
executive outlook survey, the Emerging Leaders Program, and support for and collaboration
with various “umbrella organizations.”
For more information about SPA and CNSM see:
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/home.php
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/spa/researchcenters/nonprofitstrategy/index.php
v
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ROBERT STERLING CLARK FOUNDATION
The Robert Sterling Clark Foundation supports advocacy through its program on
“Improving the Performance of Public Institutions.” The underlying premise of the
Foundation’s interest in government performance is that government agencies and
employees will deliver better services in a more cost-effective manner if their activities are
scrutinized, evaluated, and held up to public view. While there are a number of public
sector entities that monitor government spending, we believe that outside organizations
play a critical role in examining existing policies and programs, identifying deficiencies, and
promoting reforms that are responsive to changing societal needs. At times, this function
has been carried out by the press, but for persistent attention to complex social problems
and public bureaucracies, we have come to rely on non-profit organizations that make use
of the following strategies to advance the public good:





Conducting research to determine the efficacy of government programs;
Communicating information about government performance and policy options to
the media, policymakers, and the general public;
Organizing citizens to bring collective pressure on public agencies to be responsive;
Helping government officials develop and implement sound policies and programs;
and
Litigating when government agencies are not complying with applicable laws, and
other actions fail to improve their performance.
The Foundation’s focus on advocacy also reflects our desire to maximize the impact of our
limited philanthropic dollars. By influencing government policies and programs, our
grantees affect the expenditure of millions of dollars in public funds–an impact many times
the size of our grants budget. As exemplified by the three case studies presented in this
series, our Public Institutions program supports advocacy efforts across a wide range of
issue areas.
A primary objective is to safeguard the wellbeing of low-income New Yorkers and other
vulnerable individuals who are most dependent on government programs. We are
particularly interested in ensuring that all children in the State receive adequate care and
education from birth onward, and that young people and adults receive the education,
training, and other supports necessary to become productive workers and community
members.
Policy change rarely happens quickly or easily. As the case studies demonstrate, it often
requires years of class action litigation and persistent monitoring of government agencies,
advocacy, and public engagement activities. To mount these kinds of long-term campaigns,
advocates need long-term funding. Thus, the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation has
provided some $2 million in grants from 1979 to the present to Children’s Rights to support
its litigation, research, and advocacy to reform New York City’s child welfare system.
vi
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY CASE STUDIES
The Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management has developed three multi-media case
studies on landmark attempts by nonprofit organizations to drive policy changes on key
issues in New York City. The three issues are:
Case 1: Solid Waste Management and Environmental Justice. This case examines
the continuing work of community-based organizations and public interest lawyers to
promote equitable and environmentally sound solutions to waste handling in New
York City.
Case 2: Child Welfare and Foster Care. This case study focuses on the campaign to
eliminate racial and religious bias from the New York City foster care system, to
protect children in foster care from abuse and neglect, and to improve child welfare
services.
Case 3: Education Finance Equity. This case study examines the advocacy work in
support of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York (1993) that brought
together a coalition of education advocacy groups, parent organizations, and
community school boards to push for more equitable funding of New York City
schools.
Each written case narrative has an accompanying video of interviews with the advocates
highlighted in the case, and an appendix with links to supplementary online documentation
and examples of print and visual media coverage of the issues.
An additional background paper, Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy, explores definitions of
advocacy and the challenges in evaluating the outcomes of advocacy campaigns. Also
available are Teaching Notes that provide instructors with additional information on how to
use the cases, with study questions for classroom discussions or assessment assignments
for all three cases, and an analysis of the particular lessons learned in each case.
All materials are available on the case study series website.
vii
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
CASE STUDY 2
CHILD WELFARE AND FOSTER CARE REFORM
GOING MAINSTREAM: ADVOCATES TAKE THE REINS
ABSTRACT
This case study focuses on the campaign to eliminate racial and religious bias from the New
York City foster care system, to protect children in foster care from abuse and neglect, and
to improve child welfare services.
The case provides an example of a campaign that initially relied on litigation as its primary
strategy; but as advocates began to take on key roles in overseeing the implementation of
court decisions and administering the child welfare system, a different style of advocacy
was needed to ensure a successful resolution of outstanding concerns about the system’s
performance.
BACKGROUND TO CHILD WELFARE AND FOSTER CARE ISSUES
Dating back to the end of the 19th century, New York City contracted primarily with
religiously affiliated private agencies to connect children in need of care with child welfare
services. At the beginning, the majority of children in need of public services were White
and they were assigned to facilities based on religion. Beginning early in the 20th century,
and continuing through the period following the Second World War, the number of AfricanAmericans in the city began to grow exponentially, as did the needs of children from that
community who were coming into the foster care system. The publicly funded sectarian
agencies were not willing to accommodate the new population, and facilities designated
specifically for African-Americans and other children of color were insufficient and
overcrowded. In the 1970s, the city’s child welfare system was called to account for its
treatment of these children as a slew of news stories, published reports, and lawsuits
highlighted tales of rampant discrimination, neglect, and abuse.
Among the lawsuits brought against the city was Wilder v. Bernstein (originally Wilder v.
Sugarman), filed in 1973 on behalf of 13-year-old Shirley Wilder and other AfricanAmerican foster children. Wilder’s father had filed a petition declaring his daughter in need
of supervision and given her up for foster care. According to the suit, none of the agencies
would accept her because she was an African- American Protestant. Initiated by the
Children’s Rights Project, then a project of the New York Civil Liberties Union, the suit was
brought against the city, state, and private agencies, contending that children of color were
placed in inferior facilities due to their race and that the city’s contracting with religious
organizations for foster care services was a violation of the separation of church and state.
1
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Wilder also challenged Catholic agencies’ refusal to provide access to family planning
information and resources.
While the Wilder case focused on discrimination in placement based on race and religion,
other stories continued to surface about the terrible conditions many foster children had to
endure. Poor monitoring and supervision of children in foster care, who by the 1980s were
majority African- American and Latino, led to many children suffering neglect, abuse, and in
some cases death. The city received additional criticism about a series of cases where the
deaths of children in foster care went uninvestigated. The continued inadequacy of the city’s
efforts led to further lawsuits, including one in which the Legal Aid Society claimed that
children were not receiving the most basic of necessities while in the city’s custody.
In 1995, the murder of six-year-old Elisa Izquierdo by her mother again brought attention
to New York City’s child welfare system. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani responded by creating the
Administration for Children’s Services (ACS), a stand-alone agency dedicated to services for
children. He appointed Nicholas Scoppetta to be the agency’s first commissioner with a
mandate to reform child welfare practices. At around the same time, Children’s Rights filed
a lawsuit against the city and state on behalf of over 100,000 children who had been
harmed by the failures of the city’s child welfare system. The Marisol v. Giuliani lawsuit
charged that the city did not adequately care for and protect children in its custody, and
sought to reform all aspects of the system.
In 1999, a settlement was reached requiring the city to comply with the recommendations
of an independent advisory panel of outside experts, which was given access to all aspects
of the child welfare agency and empowered to issue progress reports and determine if the
city was acting in good faith in implementing systemic reforms. In 2002, the Special Child
Welfare Advisory Panel (commonly known as the Marisol Panel) issued its final report. It
stated that significant reforms had taken place but that there was still much work to be
done. A new advisory panel was put together at the behest of then ACS Commissioner
William Bell to continue the efforts of the original court- mandated panel. In 2004, John
Mattingly, formerly Director of Human Service Reforms at the Annie E. Casey Foundation
and a member of both advisory panels, was named ACS Commissioner. Mattingly’s
appointment ushered in a new era of cooperation between organizations such as Children’s
Rights and ACS. Recent reform efforts have focused on areas in the child welfare system
that still need to be improved, including reducing the amount of time children spend in
foster care and improving the quality of services provided by private agencies under
contract to the city.
The following table outlines key events in efforts to reform the city’s child welfare and
foster care systems (see Table 1).
2
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Table 1: Timeline of Key Events
Year
1973
Event
Children’s Rights Project is established at the New York Civil Liberties Union. It
later becomes part of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
Children’s Rights Project files Wilder v. Bernstein.
1977
Wilder case is withdrawn and re-filed to overcome procedural delays.
1979
The New York State Child Welfare Reform Act is passed, directing attention and
resources to preventive services, in an effort to reduce foster care caseloads.
1983
The Wilder case goes to trial.
1987
A settlement is reached in the Wilder case. The Wilder Decree stipulates firstcome first served placement, access to family planning, no excessive religious
symbols in agencies, and a computerized system showing vacancies.
1995
The Children’s Rights Project of ACLU becomes an independent organization,
Children’s Rights.
Children’s Rights files Marisol v. Giuliani
1996
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani creates the Administration for Children’s Services
(ACS), removing child welfare and foster care from under the umbrella of the
Human Resources Administration.
1997
The Wilder Decree expires.
1998
The settlement in the Marisol case creates the Special Child Welfare Advisory
Panel (Marisol Panel), comprised of independent experts who will have
unprecedented access to city files and records and authority to make
recommendations for systemic change.
2002
The Special Child Welfare Advisory Panel issues its final report, highlighting
significant improvements and areas where further progress needs to be made.
ACS Commissioner creates the New York City Child Welfare Advisory Panel to
continue reform oversight.
20062008
Children’s Rights works with ACS to implement reforms in campaign titled,
“Safeguarding our Children.”
2009
Children’s Rights releases report, The Long Road Home: A Study of Children
Stranded in New York City Foster Care.
ACS announces One Year to Family initiative aimed at strengthening the child
welfare workforce and reducing the amount of time children spend in foster
care.
3
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
ADVOCACY ON FOSTER CARE ISSUES
When Children’s Rights filed Wilder v. Bernstein in 1973, Executive Director Marcia
Robinson Lowry believed it had a relatively simple premise. Under existing law, the
constitutional doctrine of separation of church and state was interpreted to preclude the
awarding of public funds to religious institutions. Yet this is exactly what was happening,
and had been happening for years, in New York City’s foster care system. For over a
century, religious institutions had been the primary organizations with which the city
contracted for foster care placement services. Hearing about the discrimination AfricanAmerican children in particular faced, Lowry decided to challenge the constitutionality of a
system that was clearly not serving many of those who needed it most. Shirley Wilder
became the name behind the suit, but according to Lowry, the Wilder case was less about
the treatment of children and more about the violation of basic constitutional principles. To
Lowry’s surprise, victory would not come quickly or easily.
Because of disputes over standing and constitutional issues, a decade passed before the case
even went to trial. During years of legal hurdles, Children’s Rights persisted in arguing the
legitimacy of its case, even as the city attempted to respond to some of the issues advocates
had raised. In the meantime, the New York State Child Welfare Reform Act was passed in
1979 with a focus on preventive services, in the hopes that fewer children would need
foster care and that the reduction in foster care caseloads would mitigate deficiencies in the
system. However, because of continuing high poverty rates and the epidemics of crack and
AIDS, foster care caseloads continued to swell throughout the 1980s and into the late 1990s.
Nonetheless, the Act was considered a positive sign that the reform of child welfare and
foster care was becoming more of a priority.
The Wilder Decree
In 1987, fourteen years after the initial suit was filed, a settlement was reached in the
Wilder case. The settlement, commonly known as the Wilder Decree, stipulated that all
children who enter the child welfare system are to receive a timely evaluation of their needs
and be placed on a first-come, first-serve basis in the best available agency program,
regardless of race and religion. The city was required to implement a computerized system
showing vacancies, as a way of informing and monitoring agencies and placement practices,
and ensuring that children were not being discriminated against. Child welfare
organizations were also directed to eliminate excessive religious displays in their facilities
and to stop denying family planning assistance and counseling to children in care, which
many organizations did on religious grounds. The Decree also called for the implementation
of a system to evaluate the quality of foster care programs.
The Wilder Decree was upheld after appeals from religious agencies, and a panel was
convened to oversee reform efforts. By the time the settlement was reached, however, new
problems were arising in the city’s child welfare and foster care systems. While the number
of children in need of foster care services continued to swell, White children were almost
completely removed from the landscape. Discrimination was no longer the issue, and to
some, the Wilder case seemed almost irrelevant in the new climate. According to Gail
4
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Nayowith, former Executive Director of the Citizens Committee for Children of New York
(CCC), “By the time litigation ended…all of the children in the system were [of color] and all
of the nonprofits were serving them.” For Lowry and other child welfare advocates, the
attention shifted from discriminatory practices to the treatment and well-being of children
in the system.
Marisol v. Giuliani
In November 1995, New York City was rattled by a child’s death that almost singlehandedly altered the government bureaucracy that dealt with child welfare. Six-year-old
Elisa Izquierdo was beaten to death by her mother after suffering years of abuse at the
hands of her mother and step-father. The case again brought attention to the inadequacies
of the city’s child welfare system, which was criticized for missing opportunities to
intervene and save the child from her drug-addicted and abusive mother. Elisa’s death was
symptomatic of continuing problems, and given the growing number of reported cases of
negligence, abuse, and deaths of children, Children’s Rights felt compelled to initiate a new
lawsuit. In December 1995, Children’s Rights filed Marisol v. Giuliani, named after a fiveyear-old foster child found locked in a closet. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of
thousands of foster children negatively affected by the city’s practices. According to the
lawsuit, the shortage of workers and appropriate placements resulted in poor oversight and
neglect, leading to mental and physical harm to children.
In January 1996, in response to the death of Izquierdo, New York City Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani announced the creation of the ACS, removing child welfare services from under the
umbrella of the Human Resources Administration (HRA), the city’s primary social services
agency. The creation of a separate agency to handle child welfare services signaled that the
city was serious about dealing with issues within the child welfare and foster care systems.
The agency’s first Commissioner, Nicholas Scoppetta, came to the position with plans for
reform and a willingness to work with outside advocates and advisors. While Scoppetta
worked to shape the new agency, instituting much-needed changes in the child welfare
system, the Marisol case moved along in the courts.
The Marisol Panel
ACS Commissioner Scoppetta did not want to be bogged down in a lawsuit over child
welfare issues. “The leadership at ACS wanted to avoid a long protracted struggle in the
court as well because they had…a reform plan…and they saw the lawsuit as outsiders who
didn’t understand what was going on,” says current ACS Commissioner John Mattingly. In
1998, a settlement was reached in the Marisol v. Giuliani case which stipulated the
formation of a Special Child Welfare Advisory Panel to oversee the city’s reform efforts. The
panel was comprised of five national experts in the field of child welfare including panel
Chair Doug Nelson, President of the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the future
Commissioner John Mattingly who at that time was a program officer at the Casey
Foundation. The panel had unprecedented access to city information and influence over
agency practices. The Casey Foundation continued to support the New York City child
welfare system’s reform process for a number of years.
5
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
The Special Child Welfare Advisory Panel closely reviewed ACS’s reform efforts and issued
several public reports on the agency’s progress. The panel issued a concluding report in
2000, but was invited by Commissioner Scoppetta to continue its oversight work for two
more years. In 2002, the panel issued a final report, noting that the agency had made
significant improvements in the child welfare system but that there was still considerable
work to be done. The same day the report was published, then ACS Commissioner William
Bell announced the formation of a new panel to pick up where the court-mandated panel
left off. Chaired by Gail Nayowith, the New York City Child Welfare Advisory Panel
continued to review and advise ACS’s reform efforts.
According to Nayowith,
“[Commissioner] Bell felt it was important, not just for public perception but for continuity
of this new mission and continuity of reform, to have people continue to provide advice and
guidance and sometimes oversight.”
The invitation of experts to oversee ACS’s reform efforts began a shift in the relationship
between the city agency and outside advocates. Though the initial advisory panel was
mandated by the court as part of the Marisol settlement, its tenure was extended at the
request of Commissioner Scoppetta, and The New York City Child Welfare Advisory Panel
was invited in by Commissioner Bell. “The idea was that credible people with independent
standing, professional standing in the world would bring their credibility to bear on this
system… and that all parties had to respect this group and take them seriously,” says
Nayowith. The panel worked primarily on the issue of family team conferencing, a practice
that involves families in creating individualized plans that will best address the needs of
children and their families. As significant as the work of the panel itself, was the fact that
ACS had voluntarily opened the door to outside experts in an effort to improve its services.
The Long Road Home
On November 10, 2009, Children’s Rights released The Long Road Home: A Study of Children
Stranded in New York City Foster Care, a report detailing the problem of children languishing
in New York City’s foster care system without being placed into stable, permanent homes.
The report found that permanency outcomes for children in foster care in New York City are
among the poorest in the country. It concluded that a lack of urgency, a lack of
accountability, and a lack of adequate resources all combined to keep children in the
system. There has been a reduction in the number of children in foster care in New York
City, from more than 40,000 children at the peak of the surge in 1997 to just over 16,000 in
2009, but children were still staying in foster care for many years without returning home
to their families, getting adopted, or attaining permanency through legal guardianship.
There were more than 4,000 children in New York City who had remained in foster care for
two years or more. For children with an adoption plan the median time from entry into
foster care to adoption was almost five years. The report made 18 recommendations that
focused on the major actions needed to shorten the pathways to permanency for children in
foster case, to improve the quality and timeliness of case practice and court proceedings, to
strengthen the standards used to measure the system’s performance, and to ensure the
adequacy of the resources deployed throughout the system.
On the day of the report’s release, ACS announced a city- wide campaign to speed up the
pace of permanency for all children in the foster care system, called One Year to Family. The
6
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
campaign, to be implemented by ACS and its contracted nonprofit foster care agencies,
sought to ensure that as many children as possible would achieve permanency within one
year.
The timing of the report’s release and the city’s announcement was no coincidence. There
has been an unprecedented level of collaboration in recent years between Children’s Rights
and other advocates and ACS, thanks in large part to the appointment of John Mattingly as
the agency’s Commissioner. Mattingly’s prior work as an advocate for disadvantaged
children, and his role on the advisory panels that followed the Marisol lawsuit meant that
children’s advocates in New York City felt that they were now working with “one of their
own.” The “Long Road Home” page on the website of Children’s Rights acknowledges that
the report was developed in collaboration with ACS and a link for continuing advocacy
efforts takes readers to a description of the ACS “One Year to Family” campaign.
After decades of lawsuits and court-mandated advisory panels, advocates have not only
produced significant changes within the system, but in some respects they have taken over
the system. Commissioner Mattingly realizes, however, that his former role as an advocate,
and his willingness to work with child welfare organizations, won’t make his agency
immune to calls to continually improve the system. “A system is not going to change
overnight, these are ten year operations … so there will be a period where they’ll be back
demanding things the way advocates tend to do,” says Mattingly. And as the economic
downturn brings budget reductions for child welfare services, advocates are continuing to
work to make sure that the voices of children are still being heard.
ADVOCACY STRATEGIES
Advocates for reform of the child welfare and foster care systems in New York City have
utilized a variety of strategies to bring about changes.
Legal and Legislative Strategies
From the 1970s through the 1990s, litigation was the dominant strategy of child welfare
advocates seeking to improve the foster care system in New York City. The Wilder v.
Bernstein and Marisol v. Giuliani cases are typical of the numerous class-action lawsuits filed
around the country in an effort to force reforms in child welfare systems. While most of the
lawsuits eventually resulted in settlements that improved the foster care system, they also
took many years to resolve and the resulting remedies were not always conducive to true
reform. There is always the danger that court settlements end up micromanaging the
system with compliance benchmarks that become ends in themselves and distractions from
other possibly better outcomes. Children’s Rights and other advocates recognized the need
for other strategies in order to effect sound policy reforms and improve casework practices.
Consultative and Advisory Committees
The Marisol Panel was seen as a significant shift in reform strategies. The 1998 settlement
that created the panel ended the impasse of litigation and allowed Commissioner Scoppetta
7
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
to work toward reform advised by a well-respected group of external child welfare
professionals, unfettered by the courts. The panel was seen as providing the benefits of a
lawsuit without the drawbacks of drawn-out, expensive litigation and a climate of
adversarial relations. The tenure of the original panel was extended and after it had issued a
final report Commissioner Bell formed a new panel as he believed the reform efforts of ACS
would benefit from the public accountability that it could provide. The work of these panels
laid the groundwork for the current climate of dialogue and cooperation.
Research and Policy Analysis
Children’s Rights is still pursuing litigation it considers necessary in other parts of the
country, but it has taken a step back from using the courts to improve New York City’s child
welfare system. “Law is very, very effective but we can make it more effective when we also
use expertise. When we add the expertise of the people who know the policy work, we can
make our reform efforts much more effective,” says Lowry. In recent years, Lowry’s
organization has dedicated itself more to policy research and analysis, producing multiple
reports highlighting shortcomings in the child welfare and foster care systems. Lowry
credits a new environment for allowing her to move away from litigation and toward a
more cooperative policy oriented approach. The Long Road Home was the latest in a series
of reports that included the 2007 At the Crossroads, which demonstrated that despite a
decade of reforms in the New York City foster care system, safety and permanency
outcomes for many children and families have not significantly improved and, in some
cases, have worsened.
CCC analyzes city government budget and operational data to evaluate the impact on
children. Its Keeping Track of New York City’s Children project, which originally appeared
annually in print form and is now also available as an interactive online database, uses over
400 different indicators to map child well-being in New York City at the community district
level.
Coalition Building and Capacity Development
There are many organizations in New York City dedicated to children’s well-being, and they
often collaborate with each other around particular issues and/or advocacy strategies being
used. Organizations such as Children’s Rights, the Legal Aid Society, and Lawyers for
Children have all utilized litigation to advance the rights of children in New York City,
sometimes working together as was the case with Children’s Rights and Lawyers for
Children in Marisol v. Giuliani, and at other times pursuing separate lawsuits. Organizations
such as CCC take a different approach, processing and gathering data, producing reports and
advising officials on implementing policy and administrative changes. CCC often works with
organizations representing direct service providers and parents of children in the foster
care system. These groups usually make up a significant portion of the crowd at press
conferences and other events designed to get the attention of elected leaders and appointed
officials.
8
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDIES SERIES
Community Support and Direct Action
According to Jennifer March-Joly, Executive Director of CCC, the Internet has helped
advocacy organizations tremendously in building community support for policy reforms
and mobilizing grassroots advocacy. CCC used to conduct postcard campaigns, in which
they would drop off postcards addressed to elected and appointed officials with direct
service providers and urge them to get as many filled out and mailed as possible. Now,
using “viral advocacy”, CCC is able to mobilize thousands of New Yorkers to write elected
officials about areas of concern within the child welfare system in a much more efficient and
economical way than ever before. CCC utilizes software that sends custom letters to its
membership, allows for those letters to be forwarded to friends, and then sent on to state
and federal officials. They have also customized the program so that members can send
personalized emails to their representatives. As part of it…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment

---

Why Choose Us

• 100% non-plagiarized Papers
• 24/7 /365 Service Available
• Affordable Prices
• Any Paper, Urgency, and Subject
• Will complete your papers in 6 hours
• On-time Delivery
• Money-back and Privacy guarantees
• Unlimited Amendments upon request
• Satisfaction guarantee

How it Works

• Click on the “Place Order” tab at the top menu or “Order Now” icon at the bottom and a new page will appear with an order form to be filled.
• Fill in your paper’s requirements in the "PAPER DETAILS" section.
• Fill in your paper’s academic level, deadline, and the required number of pages from the drop-down menus.
• Click “CREATE ACCOUNT & SIGN IN” to enter your registration details and get an account with us for record-keeping and then, click on “PROCEED TO CHECKOUT” at the bottom of the page.
• From there, the payment sections will show, follow the guided payment process and your order will be available for our writing team to work on it.